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PROTECTING THE INNOCENT FROM
FALSE CONFESSIONS AND LOST
CONFESSIONS-AND FROM MIRANDA
PAUL G. CASSELL"
For most of the last several decades, criminal procedure
scholarship-mirroring the Warren Court landmarks it was
commenting on-spent little time discussing the guiltless and
much discussing the guilty. Recent scholarship suggests a dif-
ferent focus is desirable. As one leading scholar recently put it,
"the Constitution seeks to protect the innocent."'
Professors Leo and Ofshe's preceding article,2 along with ar-
ticles like it by (among others) Welsh White and Al Alschuler,4
commendably adopts this approach. Focusing on the plight of
an innocent person who confessed to a crime he5 did not com-
mit, they recommend certain changes in the rules governing po-
" Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law (cassellp@law.utah.edu).
Thanks to Professors Richard Leo and Richard Ofshe for providing me a pre-
publication copy of their article, to Professor C. Ronald Huff and Dr. Gisli Gudjons-
son for helpful information about their studies, and to the editors of the Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology for outstanding editorial assistance. Al Alschuler, Ian
Ayres, Patricia Cassell, Sam Gross, Gisli Gudjonsson, David Hyman, Lee Teitelbaum,
the participants in the Virginia Constitutional Law Workshop, and the participants in
the conference on coercion at the University of Denver also provided useful assis-
tance. This Article was supported by the University of Utah College of Law Research
Fund and the University of Utah Research Committee. My readers should be aware
that by general agreement Professors Leo and Ofshe have been given the last word in
this exchange. I have not had an opportunity to see, or respond to, their reply in
preparing this article.
'IAxn AmAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINcIPLES 154
(1997).
' Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depriva-
tions of Liberty and Miscarriages ofJustice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
3 Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy
Confessions, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105 (1997).
4 Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 957 (1997).
' Most of the alleged false confessors are men. A disproportionate number of the
alleged victims are women and children, a disparity discussed in Paul G. Cassell, The
Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False
Confession, 22 HARIv J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 1998).
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lice interrogation or the admissibility of confessions in court.
These articles make interesting reading and are sure to be
widely discussed. The articles, however, appear to provide an
incomplete justification for the policy measures they endorse
because, in protecting the innocent, the analysis cannot focus
exclusively on false confessions. The innocent are at risk not
only when police extract untruthful confessions-the false con-
fession problem-but also when police fail to obtain truthful
confessions from criminals-the lost confession problem.
The lost confession problem arises because restrictions on
interrogations can reduce the number of confessions police ob-
tain, which will in turn prevent police from solving crimes. The
most recent field research on police interrogations, done by
Richard Leo, found that "virtually every detective to whom I
spoke insisted that more crimes are solved by police interviews
and interrogations than by any other investigative method."6 A
crime that is solved ("cleared" in the police vernacular) is, of
course, a crime that police will never attempt to pin on an inno-
cent person. Accordingly, truthful confessions protect the in-
nocent by helping the criminal justice system separate a guilty
suspect from the possibly innocent ones,7 while the failure to
obtain a truthful confession creates a risk of mistake. Lost con-
fessions can also cause harm to an innocent who has been erro-
neously charged. The failure to obtain a confession from the
real perpetrator can deny evidence needed to prevent a wrong-
ful conviction or to exonerate an innocent person who has al-
ready been wrongfully convicted. Judge Friendly made an
analogous argument about the costs of the privilege against
self-incrimination, explaining that "[a] man in suspicious cir-
cumstances but not in fact guilty is deprived of official interro-
gation of another whom he knows to be the true culprit .... ,
' Richard A. Leo, Police Interrogation in America: A Study of Violence, Civility and
Social Change 373 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cal. at Berkeley)
[hereinafter Leo, Police Interrogation in America].
See William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV.
1903, 1931 (1993).
' HenryJ. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change,
37 U. CiN. L. REv. 671, 680-81 (1968); seeAMAR, supra note 1, at 48-51 (advancing this
position with respect to current Fifth Amendment interpretations); Donald A. Dripps,
Foreword: Against Police Interrogation-And the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CmiaNOLOGY 699, 716 (1988) (advancing this position with respect to the
Fifth Amendment in general); Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.
L. REv. 216, 223 (1960) (conceding that "[i]t was a mistake" to attempt to defend the
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Leo and Ofshe's article here makes much the same point, ex-
plaining that "[o]ften police or prosecutors only discover and
acknowledge their error in eliciting a false confession or charg-
ing an innocent defendant prior to conviction because they
have accidentally or unintentionally obtained a reliable confes-
sion from the true perpetrator(s) of the crime."9 Similar con-
clusions about the importance of confessions in exonerating the
innocent have been reported by other researchers on miscar-
riages ofjustice.10 All of these studies suggest that in those rare
circumstances in which an innocent person is facing the real
possibility of conviction-or, indeed, has been wrongfully con-
victed-police interrogation is an important means of exonera-
tion.
So far the discussion has focused on innocents within the
criminal justice system-innocents wrongly prosecuted for or
convicted of committing a crime. But no analysis of the public
policy ramifications of interrogation regulation would be com-
plete if it did not also consider another category of innocents:
victims of crime. The regulation of interrogation can, by block-
ing truthful confessions, lead to the release of guilty criminals to
commit further crimes-the lost conviction problem. To be
sure, the criminal justice system is properly more concerned
with the possibility that an innocent person will be convicted
than that a guilty person will escape. Blackstone's adage that
ten guilty should go free rather than one innocent be con-
victed" remains true today. But Blackstone's adage also re-
minds us that the acceptable tradeoffs are not unlimited. In
evaluating an interrogation regime, the risk to innocents from
inadequate crime control must also be assessed.
With these competing risks in mind, we are in a position to
evaluate reforms designed to protect the innocent by reducing
Fifth Amendment on the ground that it protects the innocent); see also Peter W.
Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an Impediment to the Inno-
cent One, 78 GEo. L.J. 1 (1989). But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAT. U. L. REV. 311, 330-33 (1991) (arguing that
the Fifth Amendment helps innocent persons).
'Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 474.
'9 See infra notes 166-69, 282-85 and accompanying text.
" 4 WnnLAM BiACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES *358; accord William 0. Douglas, Foreword
to JERoME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GuIlTY 11 (1957); see also Scott E. Sundby,
The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASGS LJ. 457, 458-59
(1989); see generally Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L REV. 173 (1997)
(humorously reviewing the state of Blackstone's adage today).
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false confessions. The normative force of these recommenda-
tions depends on proof that the benefits from reducing false
confessions are not outweighed by the competing risks to the
innocent from lost confessions and lost convictions. To be sure,
it is possible that a change might produce such a substantial
drop in false confessions as to be desirable. But it also is possi-
ble that a change might produce such a substantial drop in
truthful confessions as to pose a greater risk to the innocent.
This is an empirical or "numbers" issue that cannot be resolved
by a priori, theoretical reasoning. The only way to make an on-
balance determination is through some sort of rough quantifi-
cation of the relative dimensions of the various phenomena and
the tradeoffs among them.
Given this need for quantification, it is curious that the false
confessions literature never provides even a ballpark estimate of
the frequency of false confessions.' 2 Instead, the articles in the
area, including most prominently Leo and Ofshe's foregoing
work, reason solely from anecdotal example. They present no-
torious illustrations of false confessions to establish that the
problem exists. They then remind the reader that "no one can
authoritatively estimate the rate of police induced false confes-
sions"13 or that an assessment of the frequency of false confes-
sions "is difficult to make accurately." 4 Nonetheless, the articles
swiftly assert, false confessions "threaten the quality of criminal
12 For literature on the subject in addition to the previously cited articles, see Gisu
H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY
235-40, 260-73 (1992); Richard A. Leo, Miranda and the Problem of False Confessions, in
THE MIRANDA DEBATE: LAW, JUSTICE, AND POICING 271 (Richard A. Leo & George C.
Thomas, III eds., 1998); Richard Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess
Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DEN. U. L. REv. 979 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely]; Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo,
The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False
Confessions, 16 STUD. IN L., POL & SOC'Y 189 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Social
Psychology]; Paul G. Cassell, Balanced Approaches to the False Confession Problem: A Brief
Comment on Ofshe, Leo and Alschuler 74 DENY. U. L. REv. 1123 (1997); RichardJ. Ofshe
& Richard A. Leo, Missing the Forest for The Trees: A Response to Paul Cassell's "Balanced
Approach" to the False Confession Problem, 74 DENV. U. L. REv. 1135 (1997); Roger Par-
loff, False Confessions, AM. LAW., May 1993, at 58; RichardJ. Ofshe, Inadvertent Hypnosis
During Interrogation, 40 INT'LJ. CLINICAL & EXPERiMENTAL HYPNOSIS 125 (1992); Rich-
ard J. Ofshe, Coerced Confessions: The Logic of Seemingly Irrational Action, 6 CULTIC STUD.
J. 1 (1989).
'3 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 432.
" White, supra note 3, at 109.
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justice in America"15 and are "likely... in a small but significant
number of cases.1 6 The articles then conclude by proposing re-
strictions on police interrogation or the courtroom use of con-
fessions designed to reduce the incidence of the harms from
false confessions. 7
The aim of this empirical essay is to think more carefully
about "the numbers"-that is, to try and place the risk to the
innocent from false confessions, lost confessions, and lost con-
victions into some perspective. Some might despair of the ef-
fort, since it is obviously impossible to quantify precisely (among
18
other things) the "dark figure" of false confessions. But as Pro
fessor Schulhofer has explained in a related context, "the size of
a legal problem does matter, and we cannot avoid thinking
about it, or rely only on our intuitions, just because a perfect
study has yet to be done."'9 Moreover, given the difficulty of
quantification, one could simply argue for acceptance of the
null hypothesis: the number of false confessions is too small to
worry about. Defenders of Miranda quickly invoke the null hy-
pothesis to resist arguments for loosening the restraints on po-
lice interrogation because many criminals are avoiding
conviction. 0 Rather than employ the same maneuver here, I
will attempt to shoulder the burden of quantification-a burden
that is properly assigned elsewhere.
Part I attempts to quantify the dimensions of the false con-
fession problem. It narrows our focus from all persons who
'- Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 493; see also Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra
note 12, at 191 (asserting false confessions "occur regularly").
'6 White, supra note 3, at 111.
7 See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 491-96; White, supra note 3, at 142-55; see also
Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 238-39.
" Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 191; accord Leo & Ofshe, supra
note 2, at 431-32.
" Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanish-
ingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 505 (1996).
20 See, e.g., id. at 547 ("To be sure, there could be harmful net effects [from
Miranda] that did not show up in the studies" but that possibility does not make the
affirmative case against Miranda); George C. Thomas, IlI, Is Miranda A Real-World
Failure?: A Plea for More (and Better) Empirical Evidence, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 821, 837
(1996) (arguing that we must accept null hypothesis of no harmful effect from
Miranda); George C. Thomas, II, Plain Talk about the Miranda Empirical Debate: A
"Steady-State" Theory of Confessions, 43 UCLA L. REV. 933, 958 (1996) [hereinafter
Thomas, Plain Talk] (same); Welsh S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor
Caplan, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 20 (1986) (arguing that if Miranda had harmed law en-
forcement "critics of Miranda certainly would have unearthed it by now").
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have been wrongfully charged with a crime to the subset of
those who have been wrongfully convicted. If a false confession
does not produce a wrongful conviction, then the screens in the
criminal justice system have at least operated to prevent this ul-
timate miscarriage of justice. This Part also narrows our focus
to factually innocent persons-that is, "wrong person" convic-
tions. Previous research has frequently adopted this approach.
With these definitions in mind, the Part considers different ap-
proaches to quantification. One method is simply to tabulate
the number of reported cases of wrongful convictions from false
confessions, as Leo and Ofshe have attempted to do. However,
the handful of reported cases that they have collected does not
tell us much about the overall performance of the criminal jus-
tice system. Indeed, rather than collecting individual cases, the
overall frequency could be better determined by sampling a
known universe of cases. A few samples are available, which
suggest that false confessions are relatively rare. Alternatively,
one could make reasonable estimates of the proportion of
wrongful convictions in the system which are attributable to
false confessions. Based on the available (and quite limited) in-
formation, the estimated frequency is somewhere between 1 in
2,400 convictions and 1 in 90,000 convictions, depending on
what assumptions one makes.
Part II then turns to an assessment of the relative risk to the
innocent from false confessions versus lost confessions. False
confessions are a relatively infrequent cause of wrongful convic-
tions. On the other hand, truthful confessions from the true
perpetrators of crimes are perhaps the most frequent way in
which miscarriages of justice are uncovered. Given these facts,
it is likely that the policy proposals aimed at the exotic problem
of false confessions may create, by restricting routine police in-
terrogation, more serious risks for the innocent in these other,
more quantitatively significant areas. Similarly, restrictions on
police interrogation create risks to the innocent by releasing
dangerous criminals to commit other crimes. For these reasons,
restrictions on police interrogation may well present more risks
to the innocent than they would prevent.
Part III provides an escape from these tradeoffs. The exist-
ing interrogation regime, largely dictated by the Supreme
[Vol. 88
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Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona,21 is "upside down"2 or
perverse. On the one hand, it does virtually nothing for the in-
nocent. Those who are innocent of crimes will almost invariably
waive their Miranda rights, gaining little from anything in the
decision, while career criminals become adept at using the rules
to avoid interrogation. Indeed, Miranda may have actually
worsened the plight of innocent false confessors by diverting ju-
dicial attention away from the underlying substantive truth of
the confession towards procedural issues concerning warnings
and waivers. At the same time, Miranda has harmed innumer-
able innocents by preventing police from obtaining confessions
from the actual perpetrators of crimes, thus creating the possi-
bility that innocent persons may be charged or even convicted
in their stead. To protect the innocent, videotaping of police
interrogation should be substituted for the Miranda rules.
Videotaping provides an excellent protection for false confes-
sors, by allowing judges and juries to see when police have led
an innocent person to admit to a crime he did not commit. At
the same time, replacing the most burdensome features of the
Miranda regime-the waiver requirement and questioning cut-
off rules-would produce tens of thousands of truthful confes-
sions that would help protect the innocent.2
I. THE RISKTO THE INNOCENT FROM FALSE CONFESSIONS
A. CASE EXAMPLES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
The most straightforward way to quantify the frequency of
false confessions is to count the reported cases. Such a project
has never before been undertaken, and Leo and Ofshe deserve
recognition for their cataloguing effort here.24 Counting the
cases of false confessions, of course, raises a number of meth-
odological questions. Discussion about risks to the innocent
must first grapple with the question of who qualifies as an "in-
nocent" person. Previous research on miscarriages of justice
has generally focused on wrong-person mistakes-that is, the
21 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
" See AMAR, supra note 1, at 155 (citing, inter alia, STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO
TAX REFoRM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES (1973)).
" See infra text accompanying notes 206-307.
2' Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2.
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conviction of the factually innocent2 Moving beyond the factu-
ally innocent to the legally innocent would raise a host of ques-
tions not readily susceptible to empirical study, such as what
kinds of state of mind defenses (including insanity and entrap-
ment) were erroneously rejected at trial, when did the quantum
of proof dip below the beyond a reasonable doubt standard,
and so forth. The confessions featured in the false confession
literature are iivariably those given by suspects who were (alleg-
edly) factually rather than "legally" innocent. 26 This essay will
simply follow this focus on wrong person mistakes.
This essay will further narrow its focus to mistakes leading to
wrongful convictions. False confessions are certainly a problem
that needs to be considered by, for example, police administra-
tors and psychologists attempting to understand failures in po-
lice interrogation. But for policy purposes, false confessions
leading to erroneous convictions are the major point of con-
cern. If a person who has made a false confession is not con-
victed-because the police do not arrest, the prosecutor does
not indict, or the jury does not convict-then the screens in the
system have at least worked to prevent the ultimate miscarriage
of justice: conviction of an innocent person.27 Again, much of
the previous research has adopted this approach.28 Leo and Of-
she also seem to adopt this view implicitly, as the main thrust of
their policy proposals is not to reduce false confessions per se,
but rather to prevent wrongful convictions later in the process
See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN L. REV. 21, 45 (1987); see also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVIcMING
THE INNOCENT 367 (1970); Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convic-
tions are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 469, 475-76 (1996) [hereinafter
Gross, Capital Cases]; Michael L Radelet et al., Prisoners Released from Death Rows Since
1970 Because of Doubts About Their Guilt 13 T.M. CooLEY L. REv. 907, 910-11 (1996);
Samuel R. Gross, Loss ofInnocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16J. LEGAL
STUD. 395, 396 (1987) [hereinafter Gross, Eyewitness Identification].
See, e.g., Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2.
To be sure, considerable trauma may occur along the way and, in an ideal sys-
tem, no such false confessions would be obtained. I mean to minimize in no way such
concerns, but to narrow the focus to the justification offered for changing interroga-
tion procedures. Accord Gross, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 25, at 396-97 (adopt-
ing identical focus in discussion of eyewitness misidentification). One public policy
reform for reducing pre-trial trauma is probably improved speedy trial measures, a
reform I have advocated for other reasons. See Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of
Justice: The Case for and Effects of Utah s Victims Rights Amendment 1994 UTAH L. REv.
1373, 1402-07 (advocating victims' right to a speedy trial).
2 See, e.g., Bedau & Radelet, supra note 25; Gross, Eyewitness Identification, supra note
[Vol. 88
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through such measures as after-the-fact judicial scrutiny of the
credibility of confessions.2 As a result, about half of the Leo
and Ofshe catalogue, while perhaps informative for other pur-
poses, is irrelevant to this article. Of Leo and Ofshe's sixty cases
in which an innocent person allegedly falsely confessed to a
crime he did not commit, twenty-nine led to a wrongful convic-
tion.so
With the subject clearly defined-factually innocent persons
who have been wrongfully convicted-the question next arises
of how to determine who is "innocent." In the post-modem
world, one could argue that "objective" truth is unknowable and
therefore such determinations are beyond human capacity. Re-
freshingly, Professors Leo and Ofshe take the view that we can
determine whether defendants are really guilty or innocent. I
agree with them, but would add that making such determina-
tions requires careful and detached analysis. I have serious
questions about how Leo and Ofshe have discharged this task
and believe that, in a significant number of their cases, the "in-
nocent" defendants were in all likelihood guilty. To explore all
of those cases at the level of detail required to carry the point,
however, requires considerable discussion. I pursue the issue
elsewhere.31 For present purposes, I will simply assume that Leo
and Ofshe are correct that twenty-nine innocent persons have
been wrongfully convicted from false confessions in the last
quarter century. The question still remains, however, what con-
clusions we should draw from this finding.
For public policy purposes, the anecdotal evidence col-
lected by Leo and Ofshe tells us little. The difficulties stemming
from reliance on such haphazard stories are well recognized.
32
As one leading scholar put it:
[A] necdotal evidence is heavily discounted in most fields, and for a per-
fectly good reason: such evidence perits only the loosest and weakest
" See Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 238 (suggesting judicial
"credibility" determinations); Alschuler, supra note 4, at 973-78 (suggesting judicial
suppression of confessions produced in certain ways).
"Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at tbl.B1.
"See Cassell, supra note 5. I also defer to this separate article discussion of Leo
and Ofshe's suggestion that a suspect's "post-admission narrative" should be the
touchstone of confession admissibility.
2 For an exceedingly helpful overview and example of the problems with anecdo-
tal evidence, see David A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 799
(1998).
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inferences about matters a field is trying to understand. Anecdotes do
not permit one to determine either the frequency of occurrence of
something or its causes and effects... and have the power to mislead us
into thinking we know things that anecdotes simply cannot teach us."
Perhaps the most salient defect in Leo and Ofshe's anecdotal
approach is that we are told nothing about the frequency of
false confessions, the critical issue from a public policy perspec-
tive. Richard Posner has nicely described the problem in ob-
serving that "[i] n a nation of more than a quarter of a billion
people all blanketed by the electronic media, every ugly thing
that can happen will happen and will eventually become known;
to evaluate polices for dealing with the ugliness we must know
its frequency .... ,,s Claims that the legal system should be re-
formed because of false confessions are ultimately claims that
must be assessed with at least some consideration given to the
size of the American criminal justice system. Leo and Ofshe's
collection of twenty-nine cases of wrongful convictions from
false confessions, for example, is drawn mostly from homicide
cases during 1973 to 1996. In that period, police officers
around the country interrogated approximately 368,000 sus-
pects for homicide.m Even assuming that all twenty-nine of the
33 MichaelJ. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L REv. 1147, 1159-61 (1992). For similar conclu-
sions, see, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing
Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2211 (1989) (concluding "the rub is that good
anecdotes do not care if they are not representative"); Suzanne Sherry, The Sleep of
Reason, 84 GEo. LJ. 453, 459 (1996) (cautioning that "[a]necdotal evidence replaces
scientific data, and telling stories becomes the equivalent of making rational argu-
ments"); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093,
1098 (1996) ("Unfortunately, much of the debate on the civil justice system relies on
anecdotes and atrocity stories and unverified assertion rather than analysis of reliable
data"); see also Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in
Outsider Scholarship, 81 VA. L. REv. 1229 (1995) (cataloguing similar problems in "nar-
rative" literature).
'4 Richard A. Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. Cm1. L. REv. 737, 742 (1997).
"See Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All its Splendor, 56 BRoo. L. REv. 789, 802-03 (1990)
(when the Supreme court "lays down a rule for a nation... [it] necessarily must con-
cern itself with the fate of millions of people.... Accordingly, the Court's perspective
must be systematic, not anecdotal"); cf David A. Hyman, Consumer Protection in a Man-
aged Care World: Should Consumers Call 9112, 43 VILL. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998)
(concluding "'attack by anecdote' provides no basis with which to assess the overall
merits and inadequacies of a system with hundreds of millions of annual encounters
between health care providers and patients").
"During the period, police arrested roughly 20,000 persons each year for the FBI
index crimes of murder and non-negligent homicide. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNIFORM ClUME REPoRTs, CRIM IN THE UN rED
STATEs 1973, 121 tbl.24 (1974) (estimating approximatly 19,200 arrests for murder
MiRANDA
suspects discussed by Leo and Ofshe were innocent, the cases
appear to be, quantitatively speaking, a few drops in this very
large bucket.37 It is quite likely, of course, that other wrongful
convictions from false confessions have not been uncovered.
But even if further examples are found and tabulated, the im-
portant question for public policy purposes would be not
whether wrongful convictions from false confessions have ever
occurred over the last quarter century-they plainly have-but
rather how frequently have they occurred. Any number of
tragedies can be said to "occur regularly" in this country,M but
responsive action to them must be guided by the dimensions of
the problem. If it is to be established, as Leo and Ofshe argue,
that false confessions "threaten the quality of criminal justice in
America,"4 an approach different from identifying particular al-
leged miscarriages is needed.
B. SAMPLING METHODOLOGIES
Rather than haphazardly collecting individual cases, a more
logical way to assess the frequency question is to take a random
sample of cases and evaluate the proportion of false confessions
in it. Leo and Ofshe suggest that it is essentially impossible to
obtain a random cross-section of cases, 41 but there are reason-
able ways to approach the task. One sample that could be ex-
and non-negligent manslaughter in 1973); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1994, 217
tbl.29 (1995) (estimating 22,100 arrests for murder and non-negligent manslaughter
in 1994). This produces a 23 year total of 460,000 arrests for murder and non-
negligent manslaughter. The available data indicate that about 80% of all arrested
suspects will be interrogated. See Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation
in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 854
(1996) (finding 79% of suspects in sample questioned); see also id. at 854-55 (collect-
ing similar evidence from other studies). The figure should be at least as high for
homicide suspects. Multiplying the 80% interrogation rate by 460,000 suspects pro-
duces 368,000 interrogations.
"' Cf Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel The Case for an Ex Ante Parity
Standard, 88J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 259 (1997) ("Twenty-eight cases [of al-
legedly innocent persons convicted] is a vanishingly small number in a system that in-
carcerates a million people at any one time").
-" See, e.g., 1 U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERviCES, VITAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES § 5 (1992) (collecting statistics on deaths from various causes) [here-
inafter VrrAL STATISTICS].
39 See generally STEPHEN BREmER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFEcTE
RISKREGULATION (1993).
' Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 493.
4, Id. at 431-32.
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amined for these purposes was drawn by Richard Leo for his in-
teresting doctoral dissertation, the results of which he later pub-
lished in this Journal.42 Leo observed, either in person or on
videotape, 182 interrogations in the California Bay Area in 1993.
If it is true, as the false confession literature argues, that certain
commonly used police interrogation methods are likely to pro-
duce false confessions, presumably Leo would have been able to
report more than a few false confessions. Yet Leo does not ap-
pear to suggest in his published accounts that any of the inter-
rogations by police detectives involved a false confession.43 The
apparent nonexistence of false confessions in the Leo sample
suggests that modern police interrogations are, in fact, highly
unlikely to produce false confessions. To be sure, it might
have been difficult for Leo to be certain whether any of the con-
fessions he observed was in fact false, since this would involve
judgments about all the facts of the case. But one might rea-
sonably assume that Leo, working on his dissertation with Pro-
fessor Ofshe,45 would have been well-situated to spot possible
false confessions while observing the interrogations.46  Moreo-
ver, Leo and Ofshe could now go back through the confessions
in those cases and determine whether any of them were false.
While it might be time-intensive to examine all 182 cases, a
more economical approach would be simply to look in court re-
cords for suppression motions raising reliability or voluntariness
concerns.47  Presumably suspects induced to confess falsely
would report this to their lawyers, who would then take action.
These few cases could then be examined more carefully. A re-
,2 Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266
(1996) [hereinafter Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room]; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 621 (1996) [hereinafter Leo, Impact
ofMiranda].
See generally Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42.
" f< 1/182 (.005), based on the 182 interrogations apparently without a false con-
fession in the Leo sample.
4 See Leo, Police Interrogation in America, supra note 6, at i (Professor Richard
Ofshe on Committee in charge of dissertation).
"6 I do not mean to imply that Leo was specifically looking for false confessions at
the time, but simply that he might have become suspicious about the possibility had a
false confession actually unfolded before him.
4 7 As far as I can tell, Leo did not consider whether any of the confessions obtained
in his sample were later suppressed.
' Cf Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 209 ("police-induced belief




lated approach would be to look at cases involving prolonged
interrogation. Even if they are fast workers, it is doubtful that
police could conjure up false confessions speedily.49 In Leo's
sample, the overwhelming majority of interrogations lasted no
longer than two hours," again suggesting the infrequency of
false confessions. Finally, Leo found that very few of the inter-
rogations he observed involved what he described as "coercive"
questioning methods.
A similar conclusion arises from the most recent study of
police interrogations in this country, done by Bret Hayman and
me in Salt Lake City during 1994.2 In preparing the study, we
saw nothing that indicated there were any false confessions in
our sample-although reviewing the cases as they came into the
prosecutor's office53 did not ideally situate us to make such a de-
termination. A stronger suggestion there were no false confes-
sions in our sample is that none of the defendants alleged in
court (or otherwise, so far as we are aware) that his confession
was false; the few suppression motions filed all revolved around
technical Miranda issues, not the reliability of the confession.5
In addition, only one of our interrogations lasted longer than
an hour.55  There is accordingly nothing indicating that our
random sample of 173 filed cases involved even a single false
confession, let alone a wrongful conviction from a false confes-
sion.
These studies are not the only dry well for false confessions.
The only other observational study of police interrogation in
this country was by the students on the Yale Law Journal in the
summer of 1966.6 They do not appear to have seen any false
41 Cf. id. at 193 ("Most often... eliciting a false confession takes strong incentives,
intense pressure and prolonged questioning") (emphasis added).
wo Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42, at 279 tbl.6 (finding that of 153
studied interrogations, 109 lasted less than 1 hour, 32 less than 2 hours and only 12
more than 2 hours).
"' Id. at 282 (finding that of 153 studied interrogations, 4 involved "coercion").
12 Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36.
See id. at 851-52 (describing study methodology of reviewing cases during
"screening" by prosecutors).
"Id. at 890.
"See id. at 892 tbl.7.
See Project, Interogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE LJ. 1519
(1967) [hereinafter Yale Project].
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confessions5 7 and, indeed, reported that "most detectives claim
an innocent man has never confessed in New Haven.""s Older
studies employing various methodologies likewise fail to report
(so far as I can discern) even a single clear-cut example of a
false confession-not to mention a wrongful conviction from a
false confession. 9 Finally, two recent observational studies of
police interrogation in Britain, where police apparently employ
sophisticated psychological questioning techniques, appear to
report no false confessions.6 It is possible, of course, that all
these studies simply failed to detect false confessions within
their samples; by and large, these studies' methodologies fo-
cused on case outcomes rather than identifying the underlying
validity of the confessions. But it should be discomfiting to
those claiming that false confessions are the likely result of
modern police interrogation that not even one of these studies
with random samples of interrogation appears to have stumbled
on to a clear-cut case of a false confession.
Further research on this point is plainly warranted and the
methodology for such a study is apparent. Researchers outside
this country have attempted to determine the frequency of
wrongful convictions from false confessions by drawing a sample
and then counting the number of false confessions in it. This
17 See id. at 1589-90 (discussing the need for confessions to obtain convictions; no
false confessions mentioned). However, the fact that the New Haven police were
generally operating under pre-Miranda rules at the time of the study, see Paul G. Gas-
sell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387, 407-08
(1996), may limit the study's value for generalizations about today's post-Miranda
world.
Yale Project, supra note 56, at 1611.
59 See DAVID W. NEUBAUER, CRMiNALJUSTICE IN MIDDLE AMERiCA (1974); James W.
Witt, Non-Coercive Interrogation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of
Miranda on Police Effectuality, 64J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 320 (1973); Lawrence S.
Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Miranda, 47 DENV. LJ. 1
(1970); Richard J. Medalie et al., Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital:
The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MIcH. L. REv. 1347 (1968); Richard H. Seeburger
& R. Stanton Wettick, Jr., Miranda in Pittsburgh-A Statistical Study, 29 U. PnT. L. REv.
1 (1967). Other studies by prosecutors likewise fail to report false confessions, al-
though obviously prosecutors would not be the first to report such mistakes. See gen-
erally Cassell, supra note 57, at 395-416, 424-33 (collecting and discussing other
interrogation studies).
See BARRIE IRVING, ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. PROC., POLICE INTERROGATION: A CASE
STUDY OF CURRENT PRACTICE 149-50 (1980) (Res. Study No. 2) (discussing dispositions
of cases; no false confessions mentioned); PAUL SOFrLEY, ROYAL COMm'N ON CRIM.
PROC., POLICE INTERROGATION: AN OBSERVATIONAL STUDYIN FOUR POLICE STATIONS 89-
92 (1980) (Res. Study No. 4) (same).
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has been done in three studies by Professor Gudjonsson and his
colleagues in Iceland,61 where one might expect to find a higher
proportion of false confessions than here because of Iceland's
"inquisitorial legal system."62 In the first study, none of the sev-
enty-four prisoners (0%) claimed to have made a false confes-
sion, although one claimed to have made a previous false
confession to prevent his girlfriend from going to prison.6 In
the second study, none of the 229 prisoners (0%) claimed to
have made a false confession for the offense for which they were
currently serving a sentence, although some claimed to have
given false confessions at some earlier time.6 A follow-up study
with a larger sample size found that 5 of 509 (less than 1%) of
the prison inmates claimed to have made a "false confession"
with regard to the offense for which they were currently serving
a prison sentence. 8 From the data in this last study, the authors
concluded that "a very small proportion of prisoners ... are
6, Dr. Gudjonsson has published a text on interrogations, including extensive dis-
cussion of false confessions and urging greater awareness of the problem. See
GUDJONSSON, supra note 12, at 205-322. In that text, he concluded that "[h]ow many
false confessions occur in different countries is impossible to estimate." Id. at 205.
His research discussed below appears to be an effort to answer this important ques-
tion.
6'2 Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon F. Sigurdsson, How Frequently Do False Confessions Oc-
cur?: An Empirical Study Among Prison Inmates, 1 PSYCHOL - M & L. 21, 25 (1994).
0 Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Hannes Petursson, Custodial Interrogation: Why Do Suspects
Confess and How Does it Relate to Their Crime, Attitude and Personality?, 12 PaFSON. &
INDiv. DIMRENcas 295, 298 (1991).
' Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, supra note 62, at 23-24. A total of 27 (12%) claimed
to have made a false confession during a police interview at some point in their
criminal careers. Id. It is difficult to evaluate the significance of the 12% figure, be-
cause it came from prisoners with extensive records and "frequent previous contacts
with the police." Id. at 24. If we assume that each of the prisoners had been ques-
tioned previously 20 times by police and that the false confessors gave one false con-
fession each, then the frequency of false confessions is about 0.6% (27 false
confessions 229 prisoners x 20 contacts)-an estimate consistent with figure derived
in the study cited in the following footnote.
6SeeJon F. Sigurdsson & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychological Characteristics of
"False Confessors:" A Study Among Icelandic Prison Inmates and Juvenile Offenders, 20
PERSON. & INDiV. DIFERENCES 321, 324 (1996). The study also found, consistent with
their previous study, see Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, supra note 62, that 12% claimed
"to have made a 'false confession' at some stage in their lives." Sigurdsson & Gud-
jonsson, supra, at 326. From this fact, the authors concluded that "[tihe great major-
ity (92%) of these 'false confessions' have nothing to do with the offences for which
they are currently serving a prison sentence. Indeed, many were associated with in-
terrogations conducted some years previously." Id. It is also worth noting that more
than three-quarters of the "false confessions" in this study were to property crimes or
serious traffic violations. Id. at 325 tbl.2. I am indebted to Professor Leo for calling
this study to my attention.
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currently serving a sentence for an offence they claim they did
not commit."r The authors also added that all five of the false
confessors "had also been convicted and sentenced concur-
rently for other similar offences. Therefore, it is unlikely that
their 'false confession' resulted on its own in a prison sentence
although it might have influenced the length of the sentence."67
Throughout the text of their article, Drs. Sigurdsson and Gud-
jonsson placed the phrase "false confession" in quotations be-
cause it was "dependant on the self-report of the prison
inmates" and "[i] n view of the presence of personality disorder
among this group, one must be cautious about accepting un-
critically their version of events.""8 They also noted that "[n] one
of the cases in the present study had been referred to a psy-
chologist for pre-trial report in regard to their 'false confes-
sion"' (apparently a readily available procedure in cases with
serious issues) and that "none of the 'false confessors' requested
assistance from the researchers to prove their innocence.
"6
The same study also took another sample, this one of 108
Icelandic juveniles who had made full admissions to the police
and subsequently pleaded guilty. Not one of the juveniles in the
sample claimed to have ever made a "false confession" to the po-
lice.70 Similarly, a study of sixty British juveniles found that
while fourteen reported to have made a false confession, these
were all "voluntary"-that is, made to help protect a friend or
relative from prosecution.71 This typically occurred when the
suspects were under the age of fourteen and could not suffer
legal consequences from confessing. This "service" was pro-
vided to older friends, leading the study's author to conclude
that "[t]his type of false confession may be unique to a delin-
quent population.0 2 While one must surely be cautious about
6Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, supra note 65, at 326.
67 Id. at 326-27.
6Id. at 328. In another article based on the same data, Sigurdsson and Gudjons-
son also found that the "false confessors" were heavily dependent on illicit drugs.
John F. Sigurdsson & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Illicit Drug Use Among "False Confessors:" A
Study Among Icelandic Prison Inmates, 50 NoRD.J. PsycmATRY 324, 327 (1996).
' Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, supra note 65, at 328.
71 Id. at 322.
7' Graeme Richardson, A Study of Interrogative Suggestibility in an Adolescent Fo-
rensic Population 87 (1991) (unpublished M.Sc. Thesis, Univ. of Newcastle Upon
Tyne) (on file with author). For further discussion of such "voluntary" false confes-
sions, see infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
' Richardson, supra note 71, at 87.
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generalizing from foreign experiences, these studies also cast
doubt on the claim that wrongful convictions from false confes-
sions are frequent.
C. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGIES
The frequency of false confessions in the United States ap-
pears to be so low as to have escaped detection in the various
samples that have been drawn. An alternative, second-best ap-
proach is to derive an estimate based on assumption about the
frequency of wrongful convictions and the proportion of these
convictions attributable to false confessions. The approach has
the benefit of working even with extremely low probability
events. In theory, estimating this number is straightforward:
WC. = CVx ERx FC, where
WC,, is the number of wrongful convictions from false confessions,
CVis the number of convictions in the system,
E is the error rate in the system, and
FC is the proportion of the errors attributable to false confessions.
The difficult part, of course, is in deriving empirically-based
estimates of the error rate (ER) and the proportion due to false
confessions (FC). Fortunately, the false confessions literature
contains a reference that can serve as a starting point for this
enterprise. Leo and Ofshe have cited an article by Professor
Ronald Huff and his colleagues8 placing the error rate (ER) at
about 0.5% (one out of 200) 74 and estimating the proportion
due to coerced confessions (F) at about 8.4%.75 As Leo and
Ofshe observe,7 6 Huff et al.'s article suggests that the annual
number of wrongful convictions from false confessions for FBI
index crimes (using 1,993,000 convictions as the number of in-
dex crime convictions) can be derived as follows:
" Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 240 n.7 (citing C. Ronald Huff et
al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME &
DELINQ. 518, 523 (1986)); see also C. RONALD HUFF Er AL., CoNVIcrED BUT INNOCENT:
WRONGFUL CONVICrION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1996); Arye Rattner, Convicting the In-
nocent: WhenJustice Goes Wrong (1983) (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State Univ.) (on
file with Univ. Microfilms Int'l).
7
4 HU r rAL, supra note 73, at 62 (placing error rate at 0.5%).
Id. at 64 tbl.3.3.
76Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 240 n.7.
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1,993,000 x 0.5% x 8.4% = 840.
While Ofshe and Leo caution that this estimate of 840
wrongful convictions annually is not empirically well-founded, 7
they report that it is at the high end of the "spectrum of pub-
lished opinion. ''s 8 This calculation might, therefore, be roughly
suggestive of a possible upper end estimate of wrongful convic-
tions.79 Before it can serve that purpose, however, several cor-
rections must be made.
1. The Number of Convictions
The first problem with the calculation is a mistake in de-
termining what should be the simplest part of the equation: the
number of convictions. Huff et al. home-brews their own figure
by taking 2,800,000 arrests for FBI index crimes8o in 1990 and
multiplying by an assumed nationwide 70% conviction rate, to
generate about 2,000,000 convictions per year for FBI index
crimes. 8 1 However, the basis for their 70% conviction rate ap-
pears to be a Department of Justice table presenting data for
adult cases accepted for prosecution and filed in court. 2 As any one
who has seen the famous "criminal justice funnel"83 knows, there
is considerable slippage in the system between the arrest of a
7 Id.
78 id.
" Professor Leo has also cited the Huff et al. article to bolster his argument in
other contexts. SeeJerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, The Ethics of Deceptive Inter-
rogation, CRIM.JUST. ETHIcs, Winter/Spring 1992, at 10.
8Index crimes are non-negligent homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated as-
sault, burglary, vehicle theft, and larceny.
8, HUFFETAL., supra note 73, at 62.
82 Huff et al.'s book cites a table detailing adjudication outcomes. See id. (citing
U.S. DEP'T. OF JusncE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUsTICE STATISTICS 1994, 497 (1995) [hereinafter BJS SOURCEBOOK 1994]). This table
deals with "defendants who had felony cases filed with the court," BJS SOURCEBOOK
1994, supra, at 660 (emphasis added) (describing methodology), thereby missing all
pre-filing police and prosecutor screening. In an earlier article, Huff and his col-
leagues claimed only a 50% conviction rate. See HUFF ET AL., supra note 73, at 523 (cit-
ing U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE NATION ON
CRIME ANDJUSTICE (1983) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT]). But this publication does not
list conviction rates "from about one-half to about three-fourths of all those arrested,"
id, but rather a lower range of from 39% to 57%. See DOJ REPORT, supra, at 45 (re-
porting percent of arrests leading to conviction). Moreover, this table appears to
represent only adult arrests. See infra note 84 (discussing this issue).
"See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 61 (1968).
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suspect and filing of formal charges. Thus, a 70% conviction
rate of cases filed in court is the wrong figure to apply to arrests
made by the police. Instead, the proper rate is about 3 3 %.8
Moreover, Huff and his colleagues claim their calculation pro-
duces an estimate of the number of wrongful convictions for fel-
ony crime index offenses."' In fact, more than half of their
wrongful convictions involve misdemeanors.m For present pur-
poses, however, I will not follow Huff et al.'s suggested course of
action (focusing on crime index felonies) but will include both
felony and misdemeanor offenses by simply tracking the FBI's
84 See Brian Forst, Prosecution and Sentencing, in CRIME 363, 364 (James Q. Wilson &
Joan Petersilia eds., 1995) (reporting that of 100 felony arrests, 33 typically result in
conviction); see also YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES,
COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 21 (7th ed. 1990) (estimating that for 1500 felony arrests
in a typical jurisdiction, about 550 (36%) will lead to a conviction).
A big difference between these figures and Huff et al.'s 70% figure is the treat-
ment of juvenile offenders. Twenty-eight percent of those arrested for FBI index
crimes in 1990 were under the age of 18. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAnTON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNiFORM CRME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1990, 174
(1991). While some tiny percentage of these offenders were prosecuted as adults, the
great bulk of these arrestees were presumably handled by the juvenile court system.
For purposes of estimating the magnitude of the problem of wrongful convictions,
juvenile offenders probably should be excluded, both because the juvenile system
does not lead to criminal "convictions," see generally LxS.IEJ. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW
1343-50 (1996), and because the consequences of a wrongful juvenile adjudication
are less serious because proceedings are often confidential, see generaly W. VAUGHAN
STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE OF
COUNSEL IN AMERCANJUVENILE COURTS 15-16 (1972). Cf HUFF ET AL., supra note 73
(not discussingjuvenile prosecutions in discussion of wrongful convictions). Afterju-
venile arrests have been excluded, the conviction rate for the remaining adult arrests
is in the neighborhood of 50%. See Forst, supra, at 364 (reporting that of 100 felony
arrests, 35 will be referred to the juvenile system; 33 of the remaining 65 result in
conviction); U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTIE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE PROSECUTION
OFFELONYARREsTS, 1988, 2 (1992) [hereinafter BUREAU OFJusTE STATISTICS]. Using
this data on felony arrests likely overstates the conviction rate among arrests for FBI
index crimes, many of which will be for misdemeanors such as larceny, see infra note
86 and accompanying text, that will be taken less seriously by prosecutors, victims,
witnesses, and the court.
"' See HUFF ET AL., supra note 73, at 10 (promising to produce estimate of wrongful
convictions "among felony cases"); see also id. at 53 (discussing felony imprisonments);
id. at 58 (discussing "average rate of felonies"); id. at 61-62 (using felony conviction
rate for felony arrests).
" See KAMIsAR T AL, supra note 84, at 21; DOJ REPORT, supra note 82, at 6; see also
CHARLES E. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRMINALJUSTCE 257-61 (1978) (calculat-
ing misdemeanor convictions with 1960s data). It must be remembered that about
60% of the crime index is comprised of "larceny-theft" offenses, see FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 1995, 58 tbl.1 -(1996) [hereinafter UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995],
which includes crimes such as "thefts of bicycles or automobile accessories, shoplift-
ing, [and] pocket-picking." Id. at 373.
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crime index. The crime index is a widely used figure that also
offers the prospect of comparability with other criminal justice
research. 87
Correcting, then, for Huff et al.'s mistake on the number of
convictions shrinks the estimate of wrongful convictions from
false confessions to felonies in half,s producing a total of about
394 wrongful convictions from false confessions each year,9 an
error rate of 0.04% (about 1 in 2400 convictions).
2. The Error Rate in Convictions
So far, there should be relatively little controversy about my
calculus. This figure is apparently the highest published esti-
mate corrected for an extrapolation mistake. Note, moreover,
that this calculation cannot be criticized as failing to recognize
that many false confessions are never formally reported or offi-
cially acknowledged. The Huff et al. assessment came from
knowledgeable persons who were asked to assess the frequency
of wrongful convictions-both reported and unreported." To
be sure, publicized cases of wrongful convictions may be the "tip
of the iceberg."91 But the Huff et al. estimate is of the size of the
entire iceberg, that is, of the entire problem of wrongful convic-
tions.
Huff et al.'s estimated rate of wrongful convictions (0.5%,
or 1 in 200) appears to be substantially inflated. 2 It rests on a
survey of judges, prosecutors, and others familiar with the Ohio
and American criminal justice systems, in which most of the re-
spondents checked a box indicating that the number of wrong-
ful convictions in the United States was "less than one
8' See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 57, at 440.
"2.84 million arrests for FBI index crimes x .33 conviction rate = 939,000 convic-
tions for FBI index crimes.
939,000 convictions x 0.5% error rate x 8.4% due to false confessions = 394.
"See HUFF ET AL., supra note 73, at 54-55.
91Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 191.
Others have ventured the qualitative suggestion that the error rate in the system
is low. See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OFJUSTICE: CRIMINAL PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES 4-5 (1977) (concluding that "wrong man" convictions are "very rare
and almost always attributable to a nonsystemic fault peculiar to the case");John Kap-
lan, Foreword to EuzABETH F. LoFrus, EyEWrNEss TESTIMONY viii (1979) (concluding
that "the number of cases where someone already convicted is later shown to be in-
nocent is far less than one would expect"); Gross, Eyewitness Identification, supra note
25, at 396-98 (suggesting that wrongful convictions from eyewitness misidentification
may be fewer than is generally thought).
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percent.",3 From this data, Huff and his colleagues argue that
"most responses [were] hovering near the 1% mark" and they
simply choose the "midpoint" between 0% and 1% and used it
to estimate the number of wrongful convictions.9 It is hard to
understand how the answers were "hovering" near any particu-
lar point. The respondents were given a survey instrument with
the categories of "never," "less than 1%," "1-5%," etc.9 There
was no "hovering" to do: the responses were either never, less
than 1%, or 1 to 5%, and most fell in the less than 1% category.
Of course, the range covered by the response "less than 1%" ex-
tends as low as 0.0001% (1-in-a-million) and even lower. There
is little reason for assuming that the respondents were estimat-
ing the value to be 0.5% rather than, say, 0.0001%. Indeed, the
only specific estimate of a figure within the less than 1% range
can be derived from a judge in Ohio, who responded in detail
that, based on his familiarity with all of the state's major cities,
he had the "'strong suspicion that each year in Ohio, at least
one or two dozen persons are convicted of crimes of which they
are innocent."' This was a quotation that Huff and his col-
leagues chose to feature from among all the responses, appar-
ently to show the seriousness of the problem of wrongful
convictions from a person with extensive experience in the sys-
tem.97 Accordingly, this is a more reasonable estimate of the
problem9 -- although it is an estimate not of proven wrongful
convictions but rather of "strongly suspected" convictions, and it
is an estimate that could itself be substantially too high.9 The
judge, moreover, may have been providing an estimate of
wrongful convictions for all crimes, not just index crimes. Index
crimes constitute about 20% of the non-traffic arrests processed
9 See HuFF Er AL., supra note 73, at 61.
14 See id.
"Rattner, supra note 73, at 204.
HUFF ET AL, supra note 73, at 522.
9Cf Bedau & Radelet, supra note 25, at 23 n.12 (criticizing the Huff et al. article
because "[tihe authors provide data consisting only of estimates made by others,
without giving the basis for these estimates or indicating any way of testing their accu-
racy").
In a brief footnote commenting on this possibility, Professor White seems to in-
correctly suggest that using the experienced judge's assessment would be substituting
my own personal assumptions. White, supra note 3, at 132 n.190 (asserting that "Gas-
sell substituted his own assumptions for those of [Huff et al.]") (commenting on Cas-
sell, supra note 57, at 481 n.550).
See infra notes 117-28 and accompanying text.
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by the system.10 As a rough calculation, then, one can take the
judge's estimate of one "dozen" (12) wrongful convictions
(rather than two dozen) as an estimate of wrongful convictions
for index offenses each year in Ohio. Given the number of in-
dex crimes in Ohio, this produces an error rate of 0.035% (1 in
2800),'°1 a rate more than ten times lower than the one Huff et
al. use. To generalize across the United States, one can assume
that Ohio's experience is similar to that in other states1°2 to con-
clude that, on the judge's estimate, approximately 330 wrongful
convictions occur around the country each year.'03 Substituting
this error rate in our equation produces the result that about
twenty-eight wrongful convictions from false confessions occur
each year 04-an error rate of wrongful convictions from false
confessions of roughly 0.006% (about 1 in 30,000 convictions).
3. Police Induced vs. Suspect Induced False Confessions
The quantification thus far also assumes that all false con-
fessions are produced by aggressive police questioning of the
type featured by Leo and Ofshe. This simplifying assumption is
plainly inaccurate. Many such confessions are induced not by
police tactics but by suspects' choices. Such confessions have
been described elsewhere by Ofshe and Leo as "volun-
tary/unreliable" 10 5 and by Dr. Gisli Gudjonsson as simply "vol-
untary" but falseY°6 For example, one spouse might decide to
"take the rap" for the other.
10 7
The policy recommendations for restricting police methods
are misguided if the main problem is voluntary false confes-
sions.108 Perhaps for this reason, the Leo and Ofshe catalogue
100 See UNiFoRM CRIME REPORTS 1995, supra note 86, at 208 tbl.29.
101 About 3.6% of all index crimes are committed in Ohio. See id at 60-62 tbl.4.
This produces an error rate of 12 + (939,000 convictions x 3.6% in Ohio) = 0.035%.
102 See HUFF ET AL, supra note 73, at 58 (explaining why Ohio is a representative
state for these purposes).
103 939,000 convictions x 0.035% error rate = 330.
104 939,000 convictions x 0.035% error rate x 8.4% due to false confessions = 28.
101 Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 206.
'0 4 GUDJONSSON, supra note 12, at 226.
'07 See, e.g., Bedau & Radelet, supra note 25, at 150-51 (describing the case of
George Parker, who confessed because he was in love with the woman who actually
committed the crime).
' Cf BREYER, supra note 39, at 19-29 (discussing problems of selecting the wrong
agenda in risk regulation).
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apparently excludes such confessions.' °9 Similarly, in addressing
the concern about unjust incarceration, there is a qualitative
difference between someone jailed because of a police error
and someone jailed because he is covering for his girlfriend.
To derive a figure for the more policy-relevant number of
"police-induced" false confessions, we need to exclude "suspect-
induced" false confessions. There are good reasons for believ-
ing that, among the narrow universe of wrongful convictions
stemming from false confessions, voluntary false confessions will
constitute a significant proportion. Common sense suggests
that suspects will more often "confess" for understandable rea-
sons (such as protecting a loved one) than because police have
somehow convinced them they actually committed a crime.
This hypothesis is supported by the only empirical study of this
issue: Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson found that, of false confes-
sions among Icelandic prisoners, 48% stemmed from "protect-
ing a significant other," such as a peer, a friend, or a relative.11
For a ballpark estimate, I will assume that the 48% figure in Ice-
land applies in the United States, an assumption that probably
overstates the proportion of police-induced false confessions in
this country because of the Icelandic "inquisitorial legal sys-
tem.""'11 We then need to make one other slight adjustment.
The 48% figure is drawn from all false confessions, not false
confessions that led to a wrongful conviction. It seems clear
that police-induced false confessions are less likely to lead to a
wrongful conviction; suspects will usually retract a police-
induced false confession 12 but will rarely withdraw a "voluntary"
false confession designed to protect another person. Data in
the study suggests not only that conclusion, but also that, among
false confessions leading to wrongful conviction, the proportion
of police-induced false confessions is about 38%." s
,' Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 433 (describing collection as involving "police-
induced false confession"); accord White, supra note 3, at 109 n.28 ("Since voluntary
false confessions are not induced by police interrogation, they are not considered in
this Article."); see also Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 210 (noting that
"[1]ittle is known about the frequency or risks of a miscarriage ofjustice attributable
to voluntary unreliable confessions").
.. Gudjonsson & Sigurdsson, supra note 62, at 23.
.. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
"S The study does not report exact data, but notes that of 27 false confessors, 6
later retracted their confession, leaving 21 non-retractors. Three of the 6 retractors
1998]
PAUL G. CASSELL
Applying the 38% figure to the equation produces the re-
sult that about ten wrongful convictions from false confessions
occur each year,"4 an error rate of roughly 0.001%-about 1 in
93,000 convictions. For comparison, lightning kills about fifty
Americans each year.115
4. Cautions About the Estimation
The estimate reported here relies on an extensive series of
extrapolations and assumptions that certainly should not be
viewed as generating a hard number. Naturally, more and bet-
ter data on each of the components of the calculation are desir-
able. For example, relying on the Ohio judge's estimate
16
requires placing a great deal of weight on the views of one per-
son. Accordingly, this section makes no claim to have "proven"
that ten such convictions occur every year. To the contrary, I
specifically disclaim any such precision and wish to encourage
further research designed to quantify the dimensions of the
problem and responses to it. But for the purposes of this essay,
it is perhaps enough to suggest that a reasonable starting point
may be to estimate that the number of wrongful convictions
from false confessions each year in this country might fall some
where in the range of 10 (per the calculations above) to 394
(per Huff et al.'s higher estimate). These figures should pro-
vide some rough quantification of the magnitude of the prob-
lem, subject to the following qualifications.
Even though I have revised the estimated error rate down-
ward, it still could well be too high. The estimate ultimately re-
lies on subjective estimates of wrongful conviction, and the
established human tendency is to overestimate the likelihood of
were convicted while 18 of the 21 non-retractors were convicted. We can probably
safely assume that those who confessed voluntarily to protect another person were not
among the retractors. See Gujonsson & Sigurdsson, supra note 62, at 24 (noting that
"the reason the 21 subjects gave for not having retracted the false confession was that
they saw no point in it as their intention had been to protect a person who was impor-
tant to them, and this was generally still true when the case came to court..."). This
suggests that all of those confessing to protect another person (13 in the study, id. at
23 tbl.2) were among the 21 convicted, producing a ratio of 13/21 (62%) suspect-
induced false convictions leading to wrongful convictions, and leaving 38% police-
induced false confessions which led to wrongful convictions.
114 939,000 x 0.035% error rate x 8.4% due to false confessions x 38% police-
induced = 10.
1 Vrr A. STATISTICS, supra note 38, § 5, at 34 tbl.5-5.
"' See supra text accompanying note 96 and accompanying text.
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extremely low probability events. Moreover, the estimate of
the error rate may include not only "factually" innocent persons
(that is, those who did not in fact commit the criminal act with
which they were charged) but also "legally" innocent persons
(that is, those who were not proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of the crimes against them)."' The respondents in the
Huff et al. survey, for example, may not have perfectly distin-
guished between the two.119 Juries may also have become less
likely to convict in the last decade or so. If such trends are
underway, the problem of wrongful convictions from all causes
should be diminishing over time.
One suggestion the error rate is too high comes from an in-
ternational comparison. The British Section of the Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists reported that in the United
Kingdom "we doubt whether there are less than 15 cases of
wrongful imprisonment a year after trial byjury."121 Taking the
fifteen cases a year and recognizing that the United Kingdom
has about one-third the number of crimes as the United
States,H the American rate would be about forty-five a year-if
miscarriages occur in this country at the same rate as estimated
there.'2 It is possible, of course, that miscarriages occur more
1n BRxa , supra note 39, at 39 ("People react more strongly, and give greater im-
portance, to events that stand out from the background."); H. AARON COHL, ARE WE
SCARING OURSELVES TO DEATH? HoW PESSIMISM, PARANOIA, AND A MISGUIDED MEDIA ARE
LEADING Us TOWARD DISASTER 25 (1997) ("We tend to overestimate the dangers of
rare events"); LARRY LAUDAN, THE BOOK OF RISKS: FASCINATING FACTS ABOUr THE
CHANCES WE TAKE EVERY DAY 14 (1994) (noting tendency "to exaggerate the size of
rare or unusual [risks]").
11 See Radelet et al., supra note 25, at 910.
19 At one point, the actual Huff et al. questionnaire asks about "wrongful felony
conviction, followed by exoneration beyond doubt," see Rattner, supra note 73, at 203,
but on the page generating the critical error rate estimates, asks only about "wrongful
felony conviction," see id. at 204, without explaining what qualified. See generally
Radelet et al., supra note 25, at 909-10 (concluding that Huff et al.'s "definition of
'convicted innocents' is weak, creating questions about the criteria used to include a
case in their database").
"' See Cassell, supra note 57, at 469-70; Skolnick & Leo, supra note 79, at 9.
12' BRITISH SECTION OF THE INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 5
(1989). While the Section cautioned that "[t]he figure could be much higher," id., it
appeared to base its estimate on cases in which it had "strong doubts" about the jury's
verdict, id., a somewhat open-ended standard.
"2 See HOME OFFICE, CRuIINAL STATISTICS: ENGLAND AND WALES: 1995, at 22 tbl.1.1
(1996).
1" This estimate of 45 wrongful convictions per year is well below the figure which
would be produced by the extrapolation procedure discussed in the previous section.
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frequently in this country. If so, this provides some support for
the argument that extensive American "proceduralism" may be
one of the causes. 24
Another very rough methodology producing an even
smaller error rate is to consider the number of prisoners who
leave prison because of a commutation as a measure of the
proven wrongful convictions.'2 In 1993, 264 prisoners left
prison because of a commutation. It appears that a number of
these commutations were for prison overcrowding reasons,
since 83% came from just three states (Texas, Georgia, Okla-
homa) .27 Assuming these commutations are irrelevant for pres-
ent purposes, we can simply look to commutations in the other
states to find twenty-six commutations a year.12  This figure
might, of course, understate the error rate, since it would only
capture errors officially acknowledged and, in addition, offi-
cially acknowledged through commutation to a person in
prison. This figure might overstate the error rate because
commutations are included for all crimes (not just index
crimes) and because they can be granted for various reasons
having nothing to do with innocence (prison overcrowding,
poor health, rehabilitation, mercy, etc.). For all these reasons,
the annual estimate of wrongful convictions here could well be
too high.
Before moving on, it is important to emphasize one further
misimpression that the estimate of the range of wrongful con-
victions might create. When discussing cases, the false confes-
sion literature invariably features false confessions to murders
and other serious violent crimes. 9 The real world false confes-
The extrapolation generates an annual estimate of 328 wrongful convictions per year
(939,000 convictions x 0.035% error rate).
"' See infra notes 229-58 and accompanying text (discussing proceduralism argu-
ment).
12 See Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably
Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1334 n.54 (1997) (raising this possibil-
ity).
126 See BJS SOURCEBOOK 1994, supra note 84, at 573 tbl.6.53.
", See id.; see also Givelber, supra note 125, at 1334 n.54 (suggesting such commuta-
tions are for overcrowding reasons).
1" It is interesting that in Britain an average of seven innocent persons a year re-
ceive compensation for wrongful imprisonment. BRIHISH SEcTION OF THE INT'L
COMM'N OFJURISTS, supra note 121, at 5 (cautioning that this must be the "absolute
minimum" number of wrongful convictions).
'2 See, e.g., White, supra note 3, at 105, 121-25, 128-31 (discussing various murder
cases); Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 226-38 (same).
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sion problem, however, could well be concentrated among less
heinous offenses. To begin with, the great bulk of FBI index
crimes are property crimes; almost two-thirds of the offenses fall
in the single category of larceny-theft.30 At first blush, then, the
bulk of wrongful convictions should be for property offenses.
Indeed, it is possible that wrongful convictions are more con-
centrated in property offenses than the normal case distribu-
tions would suggest because, other things being equal, it should
be easier for the police to persuade someone to confess falsely
to a larceny than to confess falsely to a murder.!" The Gudjons-
son and Sigurdsson study provides strong support for this hy-
pothesis. The study found that 85% of all false confessions were
for property offenses or traffic offenses, 7% were for drug of-
fenses and 8% were for sexual offenses and violent crimes."5 2
Moreover, jurors may be less likely to convict an innocent per-
son in more serious cases, simply because they demand more
evidence to support convictions for such charges.133 Finally,
given that many property offenses (and a surprisingly large pro-
portion of violent offenses) are not punished with imprison-
ment,13s it is also important to emphasize that the estimate is of
wrongful convictions, not wrongful incarcerations. All these cau-
tions, among others, should be borne in mind in assessing the
1' See UNiFORM Cmdm REPoRrs 1995, supra note 86, at 58 tbl.1.
"'However, it is possible that police try harder to get a confession in more serious
cases. See infra note 133. But cf. Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 858 tbl.2 (report-
ing reasons for police failure to interrogate; minor nature of the offense not among
those listed).
"'Gudonsson & Sigurdsson, supra note 62, at 23 tbl.1.
Cf Gross, Capital Cases, supra note 25, at 496 (noting the "widely" held belief
that "some jurors are more reluctant to convict a defendant who might be exe-
cuted"). A countervailing argument is the possibility that police try harder to get con-
fessions in more serious cases, producing more false confessions in such cases. See
White, supra note 3, at 133-34 (suggesting that police try harder to get confessions in
high profile cases without a suspect); Gross, Capital Cases, supra note 25, at 485-86
(suggesting false confessions are more frequent in homicide cases). Supporting this
argument is the fact that virtually all of the Leo/Ofshe catalogue involves very serious
offenses, typically murder. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2. But this catalogue rests en-
tirely on publicly reported false confessions cases, which are almost certainly skewed
towards more sensational cases. The press, for instance, is more likely to discover and
report false confessions in cases involving serious crimes. The only methodology that
avoids this problem is to draw a random sample, such as was done by Gudjunsson and
Sigurdsson.
" See BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 84, at 499 tbl.5.48 (70% of felons
are sentenced to incarceration in state court, including 81% of violent felons and
66% of property felons).
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very tentative estimate of the range of wrongful convictions
from police-induced false confessions.
II. THE RISKTO THE INNOCENT FROM LOST CONFESSIONS
So far, interrogating police officers have been the villains,
not the heroes of our story, causing somewhere between 10 and
394 wrongful convictions from false confessions each year. As
noted at the outset, however, police interrogation cannot only
induce a false confession that convicts the innocent, it can also
produce truthful confessions that eliminate the prospect that
innocent persons will be charged with crimes or that clear inno-
cent persons who have been unjustly convicted. Truthful con-
fessions also frequently lead to the conviction of guilty
criminals, which helps protect the innocent from criminal dep-
rivations. These are important points in considering the policy
proposals often advanced for dealing with the false confession
problem, which frequently involve restrictions on police inter-
rogation. This Part considers the relative risk to the innocent
from false confessions as opposed to lost confessions. It first
demonstrates that false confessions are a relatively infrequent
cause of wrongful convictions. Then, using this insight, it turns
to the policy proposals that have been advanced to restrict po-
lice interrogation to prevent wrongful convictions.
A. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS FROM FALSE CONFESSIONS VS.
EXONERATIONS FROM TRUE CONFESSIONS
This essay so far has estimated that, of wrongful convictions
of innocent persons, 8.4% stemmed from false confessions.
That figure came from a compilation of miscarriages of justice
assembled by Huff et al. in which 8.4% of the cases were from
"coerced confessions. 135 If the figure is even roughly accurate,
it raises a point of some salience for policy reforms aimed at
preventing false confessions: more than 90% of wrongful con-
victions stem not from false confessions, but from other causes.
By blocking truthful confessions from the perpetrators of crimes
that could prevent innocent persons from being charged or ex-
onerate them after charging, restrictions on interrogations
" See HuFF ET AL., supra note 73, at 64 tbl.3.3. It appears that the category for "co-
erced confession" includes all manner of false confessions, simply because no other
category applies. Huff et al. treat the category broadly. See id. at 110-41. Eyewitness
misidentification was the main cause of wrongful convictions. I& at 66.
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might harm the innocent more than help them. As an illustra-
tion, recall that (based on the 8.4% figure) 10 to 394 persons
are wrongfully convicted each year from false confessions. By
the same methodology, 190 to 4600 persons are wrongfully con-
victed annually for reasons other than false confessions's--per-
sons who would undeniably prefer a regime that gave the police
more freedom to obtain confessions. Therefore, it is important
to examine the 8.4% figure in some detail to determine whether
it really is an accurate measure of the proportion of miscar-
riages attributable to false confessions.
The 8.4% figure is, if anything, probably inflated for pur-
poses of deriving a reasonable, upper end estimate of the current
proportion of wrongful convictions due to false confessions.
The Huff et al. database rests in large measure on cases from
the earliest part of this century.13 7 The current relevance of such
dated data is questionable because police interrogation in the
earlier part of this century was, to put it charitably, considerably
less civilized than it is today.'s As the result of twin restraining
developments-judicial oversight and police professionaliza-
don-coercive questioning methods began to decline in the
1930s and 1940s39 and by the 1950s their use had "diminished
considerably."4 When the Supreme Court began issuing more
detailed rules for police interrogation in the 1960s, it was deal-
ing with a problem "that was already fading into the past.)
1 4'
ChiefJustice Warren's majority opinion in Miranda, while citing
the Wickersham Report and other historical records of police
abuses, acknowledged that they are "undoubtedly the exception
now" and that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation
is psychologically rather than physically oriented."4  At the time
" These figures are derived by taking 91.6% of wrongfully convicted persons who
need a confession to exonerate them.
'37 HuFF Er AL., supra note 73, at 62-63 (reporting that of the 205 compiled cases, 60
occurred before 1964, 5 before 1962, 29 before 1959, 13 before 1952, and 54 before
1932).
See generally Cassell, supra note 57, at 473-75.
" Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception: The Changing Nature of Police Interroga-
tion in America, 18 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 35, 38 (1992).
"'Id. at 51; see also Cassell, supra note 57, at 473-78.
.. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLMON 22 (1970); see Fred E. Inbau,
Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Cost?, PROSECUTOR, Spring 1988, at 31, 36.
" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448, 449 (1966); see also id. at 499 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) ("[t]he examples of police brutality mentioned by the Court are rare ex-
ceptions to the thousands of cases that appear every year in the law reports").
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of the Miranda decision, the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and the Administration of Justice reported that
"today the third degree is almost nonexistent" and referred to
"its virtual abandonment by the police."" 3 Thus, a collection of
wrongful convictions resting on old data will substantially over-
represent the problem of coerced confessions, as it will surely
include products of abandoned third degree tactics.
Even if the collection was from the last several decades, it is
also quite possible that the problem of false confessions would
be over-represented. Recently, courts have become more will-
ing to allow expert testimony on false confessions (not infre-
quently from Professor Ofshe),'4 which means that judges and
juries can more often identify such cases. Also, the courts ex-
hibit greater understanding about mental illness and provide
psychiatric assistance to defendants more readily.14 Because
mental problems frequently contribute to false confessions, 6
general advances in psychiatry also promise to augment the abil-
ity to identify psychologically-induced false confessions. Along
with increased understanding of false confessions has come im-
proved ability to expose and prove such cases in court. The
most promising means of identifying false confessions is record-
ing police interrogations, a safeguard some law enforcement
agencies now employ. 1
47
All these trends suggest that, within the very small set of
wrongful conviction cases, the subset attributable to false con-
fessions should be shrinking over time, and Leo and Ofshe con-
143 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JuSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 93 (1967); see also JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES
OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 48 (1968); Leo, supra note 139, at 52.
' See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1341-44 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing
district court's exclusion of expert testimony by Professor Ofshe on the susceptibility
of the defendant to false confessions) (conviction obtained on retrial); Amy Burch,
Expert Testimony Upsetting to All Lawyers, GANNETr NEWS SERVICE, Aug. 29, 1997, avail-
able in 1997 WL 8835608 (noting that jury convicted even after hearing from Ofshe);
11 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 145 (Apr. 4, 1997) (discussing two Florida trial court deci-
sions suppressing confessions after hearing expert testimony from Ofshe); 11 Crim.
Prac. Man. (BNA) 7 (Jan. 1, 1997) (discussing Florida trial court's suppression deci-
sion after hearing from Ofshe); 10 Crim. Prac. Man. (BNA) 503 (Dec. 18, 1996)
(same).
1' See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (capital defendant entitled to
access to a psychiatrist).
,"See Cassell, supra note 5.
See infra notes 294-306 and accompanying text.
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cede as much. Certainly the subset would be much smaller in
a compilation from more recent years than from a compilation
(like Huff et al.'s) drawn from the 1960s, 1950s, and even the
1930s. This hypothesis is subject to empirical testing. Edward
Connors and his colleagues recently published a study of "DNA
exonerations," that is, cases in which emerging DNA technology
was used to establish the innocence14 9 of persons convicted at
trial.150 The study rests on a collection of twenty-eight wrongful
convictions from 1979 to 1991.151 The convictions implicated
some form of sexual misconduct, ranging from sexual assault to
murder.152 This is not an unusual feature of wrongful conviction
cases, because Huff et al. report that, in their database, more
than a third of the wrongful convictions involved forcible
rape.
153
The study by Connors and his colleagues provides a good
opportunity to examine the kinds of factors leading to wrongful
convictions. As Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck, Directors of
the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School, explain, these
cases "create an opportunity for groundbreaking criminal jus-
tice research: on such subjects as 'police interrogation tech-
niques." 154 Neufeld and Scheck also suggest that, at first blush,
this collection of cases appears to be generally representative. 55
There is, however, some question about whether the study in-
cludes "innocent" persons who may have in fact been guilty of
involvement in the crimes charged against them.
"8 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 483 n.447 (concluding that "in more recent cases,
a [false confessor] has a better chance" of escaping wrongful conviction because of
"advances in scientific technology, the increasing use of audio and video recording
during interrogation, and the increasing ability of defense attorneys to explain false
confessions at trial").
'4 Or, at least, DNA technology was used to show the failure of the prosecution to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
'DWARD CONNORS Er AL., CONVICTED BYJURIEs, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 2 (1996).
"' Id. at 12.
152 Id.
,' HUFFET AL., supra note 78, at 63.
114 CONNORS ETAL, supra note 150, at xxx-xxxi (emphasis added).
"'Id. at xxxi.
"6 The study does not appear to give its criteria for determining the "innocence" of
the suspects listed in the report, but claims that the "DNA test results obtained subse-
quent to trial proved that... the convicted persons could not have committed the
crimes for which they were incarcerated." Id. at 2. This claim is hard to accept. In
some cases, DNA testing--if combined with other evidence---may well establish that
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The Connors et al. study reveals that the false confessions
featured in the Leo-Ofshe and White articles are unusual, even
in the narrowly confined universe of wrongful conviction cases.
Of the twenty-eight miscarriages of justice, only two involve the
kind of false confession discussed in the literature: Daniel
Vasquez and Steven Linscott.157 In one case, Vasquez, a "border-
another person committed the crime. But in other cases, it may establish only that
the victim had intercourse with another person aside from the defendant-perhaps
an accomplice or even an otherwise undisclosed lover.
An illustration of this problem can be seen in the case of Bruce Nelson, whom the
report describes as having been "cleared of all charges" on the basis of DNA testing.
Id. at 67. In 1982, Nelson was convicted of participating in the rape and murder of
Corrine Donovan with an accomplice, Terence Moore. In 1990, the Third Circuit re-
versed Nelson's conviction on technical Miranda grounds. See Nelson v. Fulcomer,
911 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1990) (suppressing Nelson's question to Moore "How much did
you tell them?" on grounds that Nelson had invoked his Miranda rights); see also infra
note 157 and accompanying text (discussing this case). The prosecution then re-
submitted some of its physical evidence for DNA testing. The DNA testing did not
match or exclude Nelson as a suspect. Telephone interview with Darrell Dugan, Alle-
gheny County Asst. D.. (Oct. 2, 1997). Thus, the physical evidence apparently was
left in essentially the same position-no better, no worse--than it had been at the
earlier trial. See Nelson, 911 F.2d at 930 (reporting that testimony at first trial was that
the physical evidence matched Moore, but not Nelson). The prosecution accordingly
proceeded to a retrial, during which it was forced to drop the charges when evidence
surfaced that Moore had tried to falsify a letter implicating Nelson, rendering testi-
mony from the prosecution's main witness insufficiently believable to prove guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See AP, Man Freed After Nine Years as D.A. Drops Murder, Rape
Charges, Aug. 29, 1991, available in 1991 WL 6198452 (charges dropped because one
defendant's witness, Moore, wrote a fraudulent letter and signed defendant Nelson's
name to it).
The failure to convict Nelson on retrial does not, of course, establish his factual
"innocence." Moreover, the prosecution never conceded Nelson was innocent and to
the contrary, specifically said later, "[t]he fact that we did not [convict] again does
not mean that he is innocent." Jan Ackerman, Man Freed in Killing Wins Custody of
Two, Prr. PosT-GAzEate, Apr. 20, 1994, at B1. Released from prison in 1991, by 1992
Nelson had committed a string of armed bank robberies. Mike Bucsko, Six Holdups
Linked to Suspec Prrr. POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 16, 1994, at B1. He was arrested in 1994.
Id. He was convicted in 1995 and sentenced to 13 years in a federal prison. Robbery
PlotterJailed, Prrr. POST-GAzETE, July 28, 1995, at B3.
157 In five other cases, there were "statements" of one sort or another, but these do
not appear to implicate psychologically-induced false confessions. In one of the five
cases, while the suspect gave a false name and other misinformation to the police at
the time of his arrest, the main evidence against him was blood typing and eyewitness
identification. CONNORS ET AL., supra note 150, at 50.
In another case, the suspect mentioned a "bloody rock" during a police interview,
a statement that police viewed as incriminating. The defense noted that the police
had such a rock on the table next to the suspect when he was interrogated. Id. at 36.
See Bloodsworth v. State, 512 A.2d 1056, 1058 (Md. 1986); Bloodsworth v. State, 543
A.2d 382, 386 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988). Moreover, even if the statement is viewed as
somehow raising "false confession" issues, it was apparently repeated later to a non-
police witness, Bloodsworth, 512 A.2d at 1059, and was not the critical evidence against
line retarded" suspect, gave a confession."" DNA testing later
proved that another man had committed the crime. Linscott
involved a so-called "dream confession," in which, in response to
a general police request for assistance in solving a sexual as-
sault/murder, Linscott called on his own initiative to report his
"dream" about the crime. Linscott wrote down a version of the
dream before ever being interviewed by the police and later re-
counted the dream to the police during a recorded interview.
The "dream" was the primary evidence against him. 9 DNA test-
ing later established that Linscott could not have been the
source of the semen found at the scene. 6° The case does not
seem to present the problem of police-induced wrongful confes-
sion because the dream confession occurred before any police
involvement; but some might view the matter differently be-
cause Linscott's subsequent, parallel confessions might have
been shaped by the police. Accordingly, based on the NIJ data-
base, depending on how one characterizes the dream confes-
sion, false confessions are responsible for somewhere between
one and two out of twenty-eight wrongful convictions, a range of
3.6 and 7.1%-somewhat below the 8.4% estimated earlier.
A second source for exploring the proportion of wrongful
convictions due to false confessions over time is the Bedau and
Radelet collection of alleged miscarriages of justice in "poten-
tially" capital cases. Although the study must be used with ex-
treme caution because of its questionable characterization of
the suspect. Id. at 1057-59; Bloodsworth, 543 A.2d at 387-88 (discussing eyewitnesses
placing Bloodsworth with the little girl shortly before her death).
In the third and fourth cases, regarding very complicated proceedings against
Hernandez and Cruz, the suspects generally gave incriminating statements that they
knew who had killed a little girl, but claimed at trial that the statements "were lies in-
vented to obtain the reward money," People v. Hernandez, 521 N.E.2d 25, 37 (Ill.
1988), or were "fabricated in [an] attempt to collect a piece of the sizeable reward of-
fered for the conviction of the killer." People v. Cruz, 521 N.E.2d 18, 18, (Ill. 1988).
The fifth case, Nelson, involved a police-arranged meeting between two suspects,
during which Nelson, a defendant, said to Moore, a witness, "How much did you tell
them?" See Nelson, 911 F.2d at 930. This damaging admission does not appear to be
the kind of "false confession" discussed in the literature and, in any event, it may well
have been a true confession. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (providing an
in-depth discussion of Nelson's case). The preceding descriptions rest on the study's
summary of "prosecutor's evidence at trial," which lists the most salient evidence
against the defendant. See CONNORS ETAL., supra note 150, at 33-76.
"" CONNORS ETAL., supra note 150, at 73 (discussing the Vasquez case).
" See People v. Linscott, 500 N.E.2d 420, 421 (Ill. 1986); People v. Linscott, 482
N.E.2d 403, 405 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
I- CONNORS ETAL., supra note 150, at 65.
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"innocent" defendants, 61 it may be worth noting that Bedau and
Radelet found that a "coerced or other false confession" was in-
volved (although not necessarily as the sole causal factor) in
14% of all their alleged miscarriages from 1900 to 1985.162 Re-
stricting the collection to more recent, post-Miranda years
(1966-85), the figure falls slightly to about 12%.' 6s Particularly
interesting, however, is that this figure falls to about 3% if one
focuses on the kind of false confession discussed by White and
Ofshe and Leo: a psychologically-induced confession as opposed
to a confession simply extorted through threats or violence.' T
The Bedau-Radelet collection, therefore, bolsters the suggestion
from the Connors et al. database that such false confessions are
a relatively infrequent cause of wrongful conviction.l
The critical policy implication from this discussion is that
police interrogation rarely causes wrongful convictions; on the
other hand, interrogation frequently prevents or exposes
wrongful convictions. The figure 8.4% of wrongful convictions
due to false confession should be contrasted with Gross' study of
eyewitness misidentification. Gross analyzed cases of eyewitness
misidentification, by all accounts the biggest threat to the inno-
cent. 66 He reported that over half the time (54%) the eyewit-
161 See StephenJ. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988) (identifying numerous problems with
the study). But see Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth ofInfallibility: A
Reply toMarkman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1988) (responding).
162 Bedau & Radelet, supra note 25, at 57 tbl.6 (49 + 350 = 14%; denominator de-
rived by summing number of cases counted). A slightly updated version of the article
is MICHAEL L. RADEL ET AL., IN SPITE oF INNOCENCE: ERRONEous CONVICTIONS IN
CAPITAL CASES (1992). Because this book does not contain the coding tables found in
the article, the article's database is used for the calculations reported here.
,63 See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 25, at 177-79 (8 + 68 = 12%; figure derived from
column for Table 6 coding schedule). In many cases, the authors listed multiple
"causes" of the wrongful conviction, so the 12% cannot be used as an unadulterated
measure of wrongful convictions due to false confessions.
'6' Of the eight coerced or false confession cases, it appeared from the authors' de-
scriptions, see id. at 91-172, that five involved confessions coerced through threats or
violence (Barber, Frederick, Keaton, Ross, Wilkinson), two involved psychologically-
induced false confessions (Reilly, Reynolds), and one involved a suspect covering for
his girlfriend (Parker, described supra note 102). 2 + 68 = 3%. Of course, the very
small sample size cautions against placing much weight on this figure.
'6 A similar conclusion that voluntary, false confessions are rare is reached in
Rattner, supra note 73, at 26 ("There are only a few cases in which a false confession,
given voluntarily, has led to conviction.. .").
' HUFF ET AL., supra note 73, at 64 tbl.3.3 (52% of wrongful convictions due to
eyewitness misidentification); see also BORCHARD, supra note 25, at 367 (concluding
that wrongful identification is "[p]erhaps the major source of these tragic errors");
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ness' mistake was uncovered when "the actual criminal con-
fessed" and that "[i]n many of these cases the actual criminal
happened to get arrested for another crime and confessed to
the crime in question as part of a general program of coopera-
tion with the police."'167 Arye Rattner's collection of miscarriages
(which provided material for the Huff et al. book) found that
the "actual culprit's confession" was the leading means of exon-
eration, responsible for 40% of the exonerations.'s Similarly,
Bedau and Radelet report that a confession from the real cul-
prit was frequently how errors were uncovered.10
While figures on exonerations, such as Gross's 54%, cannot
be compared directly with the 8.4% figure on wrongful convic-
tions from false confessions 70 the role of confessions in protect-
ing the innocent almost certainly dwarfs their role in harming
the innocent. Confessions not only exonerate the innocent but
far more often prevent the innocent from ever being charged
with a crime. If police properly solve a case through a confes-
sion, no innocent person will ever be charged for a crime.
Some sense of the proportions here can be gained by compar-
ing the approximately 900,000 confessions and incriminating
statements to index crimes that police obtain every year17 ' with
Dripps, supra note 37, at 261 (noting that "misidentification is the leading cause of
unjust convictions"); Gross, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 25, at 396 ("as far as
anyone can tell, eyewitness misidentification is by far the most frequent cause of er-
roneous convictions"); ef. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 25, at 57 (finding "witness er-
ror," including both perjury and mistaken identification, to be a major source of
errors in capital cases).
'67 Gross, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 25, at 421 (74 confessions exonerating
the innocent + 136 cases); see also Gross, Capital Cases, supra note 25, at 498 (conclud-
ing "[i]n most cases in which miscarriages ofjustice are uncovered, the real criminal
confesses to the crime").
" Rattner, supra note 73, at 45-49 & tbl.8; see also Arye Rattner, Convicted But Inno-
cent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 283,
290-91 (1988).
" Bedau and Radelet report that in 47 of the 238 (19.7%) cases in which a cause
for discovery of the error could be identified, the "real culprit" was responsible for
discovery of the error. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 25, at 64 tbl.7 (figure derived by
excluding "unknown" intervenor category). This number likely understates the role
of confessions because it does not include discovery of errors by (among others) state
officials, which presumably includes some state-obtained confessions. Id. at 64-65.
" The 8.4% figure rests on wrongful convictions from false confessions - wrongful
convictions. The 54% figure rests on wrongful convictions discovered through con-
fessions discovered wrongful convictions. To allow a direct comparison, we would
need some estimate of the percentage of wrongful convictions that are discovered.
" This figure is derived by taking 2,800,000 arrests for index crimes, see supra note
80 and accompanying text, and a 33.3% rate of successful interrogation, see Cassell &
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the range of 10 to 394 wrongful convictions from false confes-
sions. The 900,000 confessions undoubtedly kept a significant
number of innocent persons from being charged or convicted.
B. THE BENEFITS-AND COSTS-OF RESTRICTING POLICE
INTERROGATION
Understanding that false confessions relatively rarely cause
wrongful convictions and more frequently prevent or expose
such convictions, we are now in a position to attempt to assess
the recommendation of commentators that certain forms of po-
lice questioning ought to be restricted. Professor White, for
example, recommends that police should be forbidden "from
misrepresenting the strength of the evidence against the sus-
pect."173 Police could not, under White's regime, tell a suspect
that his fingerprints had been found at the scene of the crime
when, in fact, no such discovery has been made. Professor Al-
schuler has similarly suggested that police should be forbidden
from falsifying evidence and misrepresenting the strength of the
evidence against a suspect.
74
White and Alschuler make little attempt to assess the net ef-
fects of this proposal,75 which could on balance be undesirable.
While precise data are lacking, police interrogators commonly
confront suspects with evidence of guilt and not infrequently
Hayman, supra note 36, at 869 tbl.4; cf. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42,
at 280 (reporting a 64% successful interrogation rate, which would produce a confes-
sion rate about twice as large the number used in text).
' One of Leo and Ofshe's proposals for dealing with the false confession problem
is judicial suppression of confessions if the suspect's "post admission narrative" devi-
ates too far from the facts of the crime. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 115. Evalu-
ating this proposal requires careful consideration of the reasons why a suspect's
confession might deviate from the facts of the crime. Accordingly, I defer discussion
of this proposal to my article dealing specifically with the alleged cases of false confes-
sions. See Cassell, supra note 5; see also Cassell, supra note 12, at 1126-29 (raising ques-
tions about the proposal).
'73 White, supra note 3, at 149. White recommends this prohibition be embodied
in legislation; he recommends a narrow proscription be lodged in the Constitution.
Id. at 149 (recommending as a matter of constitutional law that misrepresentation
about forensic evidence be forbidden and that other misrepresentations be closely
scrutinized by the courts).
174Alschuler, supra note 4, at 974.
'75 In fairness, it should be noted that the focus of White's article is to justify his
more limited constitutional restrictions, not his legislative ones.
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exaggerate its strength.' 76 The only recent research on what ac-
tually happens during police interrogation, Leo's study in Cali-
fornia, suggests. that in 30% of all interrogations police confront
the suspect with "false evidence of guilt."77 Thus, the proposal
would require police to abandon a tactic they currently use in
approximately 475,000 interrogations each year.1 78
Misrepresenting the strength of the evidence is not one of
the most successful police tactics, according to research from
Professor Leo. He found that in 83% of the cases where police
used misrepresentation, a confession or admission resulted.lw
This success rate was not a statistically significant improvement
over the base success rate of 76%. Leo also found, however,
that suspects who had prior felony records or were below mid-
dle class were responsive to such tactics, giving confessions at
rates (96% and 88%, respectively) that were statistically signifi-
cant differences above the norm.s° Leo's figures plainly suggest
that such tactics are particularly useful when dealing with hard-
ened criminals or unsophisticated suspects.
To gain some sense of the potential costs lurking here, one
would like to use the Leo data to determine how much the con-
fession rate among these groups would decrease if such tactics
were banned. Unfortunately, Leo's data does not permit exact
quantification of the effect of a ban on exaggerating evidence
against suspects, so any calculations are close to guesswork. But
1
7
6 See generally FRED E. INBAU ET AL, CRUIML INTERROGATIONS AND CONFFSSIONS 70
(3d ed. 1986) (discussing "baiting questions" dealing with "either real or nonexistent
evidence").
' Leo, Inside the Interogation Room, supra note 42, at 279.
'78 This figure is derived by taking about 2,000,000 adult arrests each year, see supra
notes 80-84 and accompanying text, and recognizing that about 79% of the arrestees
will be interrogated, see Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 869 tbl.4. This produces
a total of 1,580,000 interrogations each year. If 30% of these interrogations are re-
structured, one reaches the figure in text.
'79 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42, at 294 tbl.14. It should be noted
that the interrogation success rate with this tactic was 83%--still higher (although not
significantl? so) than the baseline of 76%. See id. at 294 n.276. Moreover, it is not
immediately clear how Leo. made the difficult categorizations between police con-
fronting the suspect with "false evidence of guilt" as opposed to "existing evidence of
guilt." See id. at 294 tbl.14. Presumably for the interrogations Leo observed directly,
the participating detectives could have debriefed him on which evidence was "false"
and which was "existing," but for other interrogations it is unclear how this was ac-
complished. See id. at 272 n.26 (noting that about one-third of the sample was video-
taped interrogations retrieved from police departments apart from the department
Leo was observing).
'80 Id. at 295 tbl.15.
1998]
PAUL G. CASSELL
as a heuristic illustration, one might consider what would hap-
pen if the confession rate fell even one percent as a result. Even
limiting the focus to suspects with felony records and calculat-
ing conservatively, the number of confessions that would be lost
annually from White's proposed rule is about 9,000.18' The
overwhelming majority of these lost confessions will be truthful
confessions, given the relative infrequency of false confessions."2
Moreover, it is not clear how much of an effect this proposal
would have on the false confession problem. Even in those in-
terrogations where police misrepresented the strength of evi-
dence and obtained a false confession, it is not clear that
misrepresentation was a necessary factor. Indeed, Leo and Of-
she have specifically concluded to the contrary that, because
false confessions stem from the "inept and/or improper use of
interrogation as a whole, no single procedure can be proscribed
and thereby adequately protect the innocent."13 The efficacy of
the proposal is also drawn into question by the difficulty of de-
termining when police questioning involves some sort of "false"
evidence. For instance, the Inbau interrogation manual rec-
ommends that, at the start of each interrogation, "the interroga-
tor should finger through the case folder to create the
impression that it contains material of an incriminating nature.
Is that a prohibited "misrepresentation?"
Another suggestion that has been advanced is to limit not
the type of police questioning but its use against certain per-
sons. For instance, Professor White suggests that police ques-
tioning of "vulnerable suspects" (juveniles and "mentally
retarded" persons) should be restricted.ls 5 However, he is frus-
181 Start with about 2,000,000 adult arrests each year. See supra notes 80-84. About
79% of the arrestees will be interrogated. See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 869
tbl.4. Of these, about 58% will have a prior felony record. Leo, Inside the Interrogation
Room, supra note 42, at 275. About 43% will confess. Cassell & Hayman, supra note
36, at 896; cf. Leo, Inside Interrogation Room, supra note 42, at 280 (suggesting higher
confession rate). If the confession rate for such suspects were to drop to 42% rather
than 43% because of a ban on such tactics, the number of lost confessions would be
about 9,000. These lost convictions do not consider juvenile offenders, consistent
with their exclusion from the wrongful conviction calculation. See supra note 84. One
could argue that juvenile offenders should be included here because the harm to the
innocent does not depend on the age of the confessor.
182 See supra notes 41-128 and accompanying text.
"' Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 12, at 1115.
"s INBAU ETAL., supra note 176, at 84-85.
W' hite, supra note 3, at 142-43.
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tratingly vague about what sorts of restraints the courts should
impose, recommending only that the police "should be re-
quired to determine the suspect's age and mental capacity be-
fore interrogation" and that these "findings" should then
"dictate the range of permissible interrogation methods."1
s
With respect to juveniles, the effect of this rule would presuma-
bly be to reduce police effectiveness in responding to the bur-
geoning juvenile crime problem, an area of considerable and
increasing public concern. 18 7 One can garner some sense of the
potential risks here by noting that police around the country ar-
rested about 670,000 juveniles for FBI index crimes in 1995.1'1
Assuming that 80% were interrogated, 189 then White is propos-
ing to limit questioning of more than 500,000 criminal suspects.
No doubt a substantial number of truthful confessions would be
lost from this restriction, a point that White never addresses.
Moreover, the empirical basis for concluding that juveniles are
especially at risk for false confessions is lacking.'90
White may well be correct in suggesting that the mentally
retarded are unusually susceptible to giving false confessions. 9'
But evaluating his proposed restrictions on questioning such
suspects is difficult. White never defines with any precision the
triggering degree of impairment that renders a suspect "men-
tally retarded." Nor does he define what form of questioning
would be permissible. No matter how the proposal is formu-
lated, however, the administrative difficulties are likely to be
considerable. White's suggestion that police should make a
I id.
117 See, e.g., W.ILAMJ. BENNETr ET AL, BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY AND HOW TO
WINAMERICA'SWARAGAINSTCRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996) ("as high as America's body
count is today, a rising tide of youth crime and violence is about to lift it even
higher"); see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUv. JusTICE AND DEUNQUENCY
PREVENTION, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND ViCTiMS: 1996 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 21 (1996)
(increases in juvenile arrests for a weapons law violation support a picture of growing
juvenile violence); James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public Polic, in CRIME, supra note 84, at
489, 492 (warning of coming demographic wave of new young criminals).
"'UNIFORM CIm:E REPORTS 1995, supra note 86, at 224 tbl.41.
" See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 854 (finding 79% of suspects in sample
questioned); see also id. at 854-55 (collecting evidence from other studies that about
80% of all suspects are questioned).
There is no data in this country on false confessions from juveniles. Data from
Iceland and Britain suggest that juveniles are perhaps even less likely to give false
confessions than adults (except when they voluntarily confess to get an adult friend
off the hook). See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
' See Cassell, supra note 5 (developing this argument).
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"finding" about "mental capacity" before questioning-with this
"finding" then governing permissible methods-might require
the police to undertake the impossible.92 This proposal would
generate a host of questions that even the most well-intentioned
police departments could not possibly begin to answer. 93 Any-
one with doubt on this point should peruse the always-
contentious literature on "findings" of insanity or competency
to stand trial or face execution. 94 Questions of mental capacity
will arise frequently because the population of dangerous
criminals is generally of lower-than-average intelligence. 95 Pre-
sumably the new rules would be enforced by after-the-fact judi-
cial scrutiny of the police officer's decisions, which would
virtually guarantee that legions of psychiatrists would become
involved in hearings on the admissibility of confessions. 96 As-
sessing where all this would balance out is difficult. If innocent
but mentally retarded suspects are, as White writes, "eager to
"' Cf PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, REPORT OF THE TAsK FORCE ON
LAw 33 (1963) (concluding that "mental retardation may not be apparent at the time
of interrogation"). The British Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment and
Questioning of Persons by Police Officers attempts to resolve the identification issue
by requiring an officer to treat a person as mentally handicapped where the "officer
has any suspicion, or is told in good faith, that a person of any age may be mentally
disordered or mentally handicapped, or mentally incapable of understanding the
significance of questions put to him or his replies .... " BRITISH CODE Para. 1.4.
Whether such a broad rule could be transferred to the United States is unclear.
Moreover, even under the British rule, identification of a person as mentally handi-
capped does not preclude questioning, but instead requires the police to question in
the presence of the "appropriate adult." Id. at Para. 11.14. Even this requirement
can be dispensed with where a senior officer believes that delay in questioning will
"involve an immediate risk of harm to persons or serious loss of... property...." Id.
at Annex C.
, See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (1980) (Burger, CJ., concurring)
(doubting whether police officers are capable of making a quick evaluation of the
"suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused" to questioning); cf Welsh S. White,
Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 581, 597 (1979) (concluding
that "both from the perspectives of law enforcement and judicial administration,
courts should develop legal rules that limit interrogation tactics by objective stan-
dards").
"9 See Fairchild v. Lockhart, 744 F. Supp. 1429, 1434-506 (E.D. Ark. 1989) (more
than 60 page opinion concerning whether one defendant was mentally retarded).
195 SeeJAMrES Q. WILSON & RICHARDJ. HERRNSTEN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 154
(1985) (concluding that the empirical studies estimate a 10-point gap in IQ between
offenders and nonoffenders, although the offender population contains relatively few
very low IQs).
'96 Cf Fred E. Inbau &James P. Manak, Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Costs? (A
Sample Suruey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort), 1 CAL. W. L
REv. 185, 190-91 (1988) (discussing consumption of court time as the result of
Miranda issues).
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please an authority figure and unable to understand the long-
term consequences of confessing,"197 then allowing any question-
ing of mentally retarded suspects could well produce false con-
fessions. To prevent this, some substantial restrictions would
need to be imposed. Depending on how White's proposal is
structured, its result could well be to sharply reduce the number
of truthful confessions obtained from retarded persons, which
would be harmful to those who might thereafter wrongfully
come under suspicion for these same crimes.
C. LOST CONVICTIONS FROM LOST CONFESSIONS
While proposals to restrict interrogation could well be dis-
advantageous, even focusing solely on the protection of the in-
nocent within the criminal justice, the cost side of the ledger
only increases when we recognize that lost confessions result in
guilty persons going free-itself a cost to the innocent members
of society given high rates of recidivism. 9 s The discussion above
suggests that blunderbuss approaches to preventing false con-
fessions will harm effective law enforcement. In this brief essay,
I will not attempt to play out precisely where the balance of ad-
vantage lies on each proposal that has been advanced to reduce
false confessions. Instead, my limited point is that the propo-
nents of the changes have not yet even begun to explain why
they see the advantages as outweighing the disadvantages. For
example, previously it was shown that preventing police from
making false representations about evidence could substantially
reduce the number of truthful confessions1 9 which in turn
would reduce the number of convictions.200 This effect is likely
to be a general feature of proposals that focus single-mindedly
on reducing the incidence of wrongful convictions from false
'
9
7 White, supra note 3, at 124.
1' Even apart from recidivism, crime victims suffer when guilty offenders escape
justice. I will ignore this cost here.
"9 See supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
"0 The most conservative assumption is that about 19% of lost confessions result in
lost convictions. Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 541-44 (placing confession necessity
rate at about 19%); cf. Cassell, supra note 57, at 433-37 (estimating that about 25% of
all confessions are needed for conviction); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The
Grand llusion ofMiranda's Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084, 1111 n.161 (1996) [here-
inafter Cassell, All Benefits] (responding to Schulhofer's downward adjustment to
19%); Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 906 (reporting that prosecutors find con-
fessions to be essential or important for conviction in about 61% of all cases).
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confessions by changing police and court procedures.Y' To
prevent the exotic-a false confession-the proposals have to
recommend changing the routine-the day-to-day conduct of
police interrogation or judicial processing of criminal cases.202
There appears to be little hope of surgically tailoring the false
confessions reforms to those specific situations where false con-
fessions are most likely. Let me clearly reiterate my view that
each case of a wrongful conviction from a police-induced false
confession is an undeniable tragedyY3 Indeed, I am on record
as making this point elsewhere and also as pushing for measures
to diminish false confessions.2 But sound public policy can be
made only by considering countervailing considerations which
argue against greater restrictions on police questioning tech-
niques, e.g., lost confessions.2 0 5 And given public concern about
crime, such countervailing considerations will be taken seri-
ously. The only way to guarantee legal changes is to adopt a
new paradigm for reform-one that escapes these kinds of
tradeoffs.
III. THE RISK TO THE INNOCENT FROM M!RANDA
A. M-RANDAAS A HINDRANCE TO THE INNOCENT AND AN AID TO
THE GUILTY
The preceding section establishes that the proposals for
dealing with false confessions are problematic because they de-
crease the overall number of confessions-both true and false.
This creates problems for innocent persons who would have
been exonerated through the truthful confessions, not to men-
tion those who suffer when criminals are not brought to justice.
From the perspective of the innocent, the ideal public policy re-
20' Cf BRER, supra note 39, at 11-19 (discussing this problem of "tunnel vision" in
the context of risk regulation).
' This argument does not apply to improving police training, see Ofshe & Leo, So-
cial Psychology, supra note 12, at 239 (recommending training), which will cost society
only the funds to pay for such training and the time of the officers to receive the in-
struction rather than patrol the streets. It does, however, apply to Leo and Ofshe's
recommendation that courts should exclude confessions when the "post narrative
admission" does not sufficiently track the crime scene. For other difficulties with this
proposal, see Cassell, supra note 5; Cassell, supra note 12, at 1131.
20 Cassell, supra note 12, at 1124.
See Cassell, supra note 57, at 486-89; Cassell, All Benefits, supra note 200, at 1118-
24.
"0 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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form is, accordingly, a discriminating approach that simultane-
ously reduces false confessions while maintaining (or, ideally,
even increasing) truthful confessions. By the same token, the
worst sort of public policy reform is one that decreases truthful
confessions, while maintaining (or, even worse, increasing) the
number of false confessions. With these straightforward obser-
vations in mind, the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizonta2 6 stands revealed as a disastrous policy. It does virtually
nothing about any false confession problem-and, indeed, per-
haps even aggravates it-while concurrently reducing the num-
ber of truthful confessions.
Miranda does little, if anything, about the false confession
problem. If there is any doubt about this point, recall that all of
the recent false confessions discussed by Leo, Ofshe, and others
were obtained in apparent compliance with the Miranda rules.207
The reason the decision fails to help the innocent is obvious.
Innocent suspects want to waive their Miranda rights to convince
the police of their innocence. 2°s As Leo and Ofshe have ex-
plained elsewhere, " [a]n innocent person will likely believe that
he is not in any jeopardy by waiving his rights and answering
questions because police have sought out his help in solving the
crime and, after all, he is innocent."209 As a result, "innocent
suspects are likely to waive their rights because they do not per-
ceive a risk in speaking to police .... ,,21o Psychological research
points to the same conclusion of ineffectiveness: persons most
likely to give false confessions are highly unlikely to be helped
by the Miranda rules, because they are unusually trusting of the
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
17 See, e.g., Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 433 (limiting research to "the post-
Miranda era").
'a See, e.g., GUDJONSSON, supra note 12, at 252-53 (discussing the case of Peter
Reilly, who did not exercise his Miranda right to a lawyer because "I hadn't done any-
thing wrong"); Parloff, supra note 12, at 34 (reporting that suspect who would later
give false confession waived rights because "I had nothing to hide"). See generally
Corey J. Ayling, Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Safe-
guards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 1121, 1194-98 (arguing generally
that Miranda rules have limited utility in preventing false confessions).
' Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 12, at 989.
2
10 Id. at 1002; see also id. (noting some innocent suspects "view invoking Miranda as
wrong and/or tantamount to an admission of guilt").
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police21 ' and accordingly almost invariably waive their Miranda
rights.
212
Once an innocent suspect waives his rights, Miranda be-
comes "virtually irrelevant to the problem of false confessions
since few suspects subsequently invoke their Miranda rights."213
It is generally recognized that, after police obtain a Miranda
waiver, questioning can proceed as it always has under "volun-
tariness" principles. As the Department of Justice's Office of
Legal Policy has concluded, after a waiver, "Miranda is... virtu-
ally worthless as a safeguard against the specific interrogation
practices that were characterized as abusive in the Miranda deci-
sion .... ,,14 This is not an isolated finding, as there appears to
have been "broad agreement among writers on the subject that
Miranda is an inept means of protecting the rights of suspects..
,,215
It is possible, of course, that a few innocent persons are
haphazardly helped by the Miranda regime, simply by sheer dint
of numbers. Perhaps police fail to obtain a few waivers from in-
nocent suspects (itself a rare event) who, if questioning had
proceeded, would have been induced to confess falsely (an even
rarer event). Or perhaps the possibility that suspects can invoke
their Miranda rights to cut-off questioning discourages police
from using some coercive techniques that would lead to a few
211 See GUDJONSSON, supra note 12, at 232 (noting common personality factor of
false confessors include "good trust of people in authority"); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, One
Hundred Alleged False Confession Cases: Some Normative Data, 29 BRIT. J. CLNICAL
PSYcHOL 249, 249 (1990) (finding alleged false confessors highly suggestible and
compliant); see also Sigurdsson & Gudjonsson, supra note 65, at 327 (finding no dif-
ference on "suggestibility" score between false confessors and other prison inmates
but finding possibility of suggestibility difference in "coerced-internalized" false con-
fessors).
... See Ayling, supra note 208, at 1194-98. Since about 80% of all suspects waive
their Miranda rights, see Cassell, supra note 57, at 495 & n.623, and since innocent
suspects appear to be even more likely to waive their rights, the waiver rate for inno-
cent suspects must verge on 100%.
211 Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 12, at 1116 (footnote omit-
ted). See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 860 & tbl.3 (finding 3.9% of suspects re-
invoked rights during questioning); Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42, at
275 (finding 1.1% of suspects re-invoked rights during questioning).
SOFFICE OF LEGAL PoLicy, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 97-98 (1986) thereinafter OLP PRE-
TRIAL INTERROGATION REPORT]; see 22 U. MICi. J.L. REFORM 437 (1989) (reprinting
the Report).
2"OLP PRETRIAL INTERROGATION REPORT, supra note 214, at 97-98.
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false confessions.1 6 But the lack of any significant suggestions
along these lines in the voluminous academic literature praising
Miranda on every conceivable ground2 7 suggests that these pos-
sibilities are unlikely.
In any event, to be justifiable as a measure protecting inno-
cents, Miranda would need to uniquely protect them. After all,
forbidding testimony from witnesses whose last names begin
with "R" would protect some innocent persons.1 8 But such a
rule would not uniquely protect innocent defendants-even al-
lowing for our greater concern with convicting innocent defen-
dants-and therefore cannot be championed on this ground.219
The available evidence suggests that Miranda, far from differen-
216 The converse is possible as well: that Miranda's questioning cut-off rules have
moved police in the direction of psychological questioning techniques, see generally
Leo, supra note 139, which might be more likely to induce false confessions than pre-
Miranda techniques.
2,7 The most visible exception seems to be William Stuntz' suggestion that, because
of the questioning cut-off rules, police have a "strong incentive to avoid interrogation
tactics that the [suspect] will find too threatening." Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1948.
This in turn, Stuntz believes, might possibly differentially advantage the innocent be-
cause these threatening tactics may disproportionately generate false confessions. Id.
However, both parts of Stuntz' hypothesis need additional empirical support before
they can be accepted.
It is not clear the extent to which questioning cut-off rules have changed police
tactics. See Leo, Impact of Miranda, supra note 42, at 645 (summarizing Miranda "im-
pact" literature as finding that "once a waiver of rights had been obtained, the tactics
and techniques of police interrogation did not change as a result of Mirandd). A
post-Miranda study in Wisconsin, for example, found that "generally most interroga-
tions continued to operate under rules formalized prior to the Miranda decision."
NEIL A. MILNER, THE COURT AND LOCAL LAW ENFOREMEN. THE IMPACT OF MIMANDA
228 (1971). Nor is it clear that excessive pressure is what extracts false confessions.
Cf. Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 12, at 1115 (suggesting that
specific techniques are not the issue for false confessions). Based on the recent em-
pirical evidence published after his earlier article, Stuntz now concludes that Miranda
could well operate to the detriment of the innocent. SeeWilliamJ. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE Lj. 1, 47 n.160
(1997) (reviewing the evidence and concluding that "it is possible that Miranda makes
it both harder to get confessions from the guilty and easier to get them from the inno-
cent").
118 See Donald A. Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law:
"Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1632 (1996); see also
Dripps, supra note 8, at 715 (noting that any legal rule, like "a revolution or an earth-
quake," can help innocent persons).
2'9 Indeed, it has been cogently argued that the most important protection for the
innocent is that the gap between their chances of conviction and the guilty's remain
large. If so, prosecutors will have strong incentives to charge only guilty persons. See
Stuntz, supra note 217, at 49.
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tially protecting the innocent, especially shields the guilty.2 In
contrast to innocent persons, experienced criminals become
adept at wrapping themselves in Miranda's protections. After
spending a year with Baltimore detectives, journalist David
Simon concluded that
the professionals say nothing. No alibis. No explanations. No expressions
of polite dismay or blanket denials .... For anyone with experience in
the criminal justice machine, the point is driven home by every lawyer
worth his fee. Repetition and familiarity with the process soon place the
professionals beyond the reach of a police interrogation.2'
The available empirical data support Simon's conclusion.
Leo's study found "a suspect with a felony record... was almost
four times as likely to invoke his Miranda rights as a suspect with
no prior record ....,,22 The Prairie City study found that, of
those with a prior felony conviction, only 36% confessed, com-
pared to 59% without a prior conviction.22 The study also
found that suspects with a prior conviction were less likely to
execute waiver of rights forms, with 68% of those with records
waiving compared to 80% of those without a prior conviction.2
The New Haven study similarly found that a "prior record tends
to reduce the likelihood of success. ''2ss Interrogation was suc-
cessful for 41% of the suspects with a previous arrest, compared
to 60% without.226 Data from Britain also supports the conclu-
' See id. at 47 & n.160.
22' DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: AYEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 198-99 (1991). Simon
suggests that the impact of Miranda is thus limited to professionals. Id. at 199.
22 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42, at 286.
' David W. Neubauer, Confessions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Effects, 65 J. GRIM.
L. & CRImNOLOGY 103, 105 tbl.2 (1974). For non-property crimes, the differential
was even more substantial: only 15% with a prior conviction confessed, compared to
45% without. Id.
22'Id. at 104 tbl.1.
' Yale Project, supra note 56, at 1644. The study divided "success" into four catego-
ries: "(1) a confession; (2) an oral admission of guilt without a signed statement; (3) a
signed statement that was incriminating but less than a full admission of guilt; or (4)
oral evidence constituting less than a full admission of guilt without a signed state-
ment." Id. at 1564.
n2 Id. at 1644 & tbl-A (statistically significant at the .05 level); see William Hart, The
Subtle Art of Persuasion, POLIcE MAG., Jan. 1981, at 14, 16 (reporting that successful in-
terrogators find " [p] rofessional criminals are ... hard to question" and that "even the
most finely honed tactics often fail" because "[i]f they're professionals, they pretty
much know ... not to say word one"); see also THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF
RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 37 (1981) (for juveniles, refusal to




sion that "hardened criminals" are more likely to take advantage
of procedural rights and less likely to confess.2 However, my
study in Salt Lake City found no clear-cut relation between a
very broadly defined prior record and interrogation success (al-
though it did find those with a criminal record were slightly
more likely to invoke their rights).228 Virtually all these studies
suggest that Miranda is of special benefit to the guiltiest of the
guilty: career criminals.
Any marginal advantages to the innocent are likely more
than offset by a countervailing dangerous feature of Miranda:
the tendency to divert the court's attention toward procedural
issues. Before Miranda, the admissibility of confessions was de-
cided exclusively under a "voluntariness" test that blocked a
confession if it was, among other things, subject to an influence
which made it untrustworthy or probably untrue.29 Under this
test, the risk either that an individual defendant had in fact
falsely confessed or, more generally, that the police methods at
issue might cause other innocent persons to confess, could lead
to the suppression of a confession.m Thus, as one noted com-
mentator described the cases before Miranda, the voluntariness
test required the courts to answer questions related to the truth
or falsity of confessions.Hl To be sure, the voluntariness test
embraced a "complex of values, ' 232 that extended beyond "the
'See ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST. REPORT 51 (1993) (reporting that police found
experienced criminals less likely to answer questions); SOFfiE, supra note 60, at 69,
75 (observing that suspects with a criminal record are significantly more likely to ex-
ercise their right to silence and to request counsel); Stephen Moston et al., The Inci-
dence, Antecedents and Consequences of the Use of the Right to Silence During Police
Questioning, 3 GM. BEHAv. & MENTAL Hm.T- 30, 38 tbl.4 (1993) (finding 21% of
suspects with criminal history stayed silent as compared with only 9% of suspects
without). But cf Moston et al., supra, at 39 tbl.7 (interaction of legal advice with
criminal history complicates relationship).
'Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 895 (using a broad definition of "criminal
record" and finding no correlation with interrogation success and small, statistically
insignificant increases in the likelihood of those with a record to invoke).
2 The "voluntariness" doctrine is difficult to describe succinctly. For extended
discussions, see, e.g., JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONmSSIONs, TRuTH AND THE LAw 87-172
(1993); George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme
Court Terms, 67 TEx. L. REV. 231 (1988); Yale Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confes-
sion?: Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17
RUTGERs L. REv. 728 (1963).
2" See GRANO, supra note 229, at 115; KAMIsAR ET AL., supra note 84, at 453;
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 373 (3d ed. 1984).
22 Kamisar, supra note 229, at 755 (summarizing the case law).
22 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
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question of guilt or innocence. " 3s3 But the Court's inquiry also
included consideration of whether particular methods might
produce unreliable confessions.
Miranda has shifted the focus of the courts away from the re-
liability of the methods used to obtain confessions and towards
technical procedural questions about warnings and waivers.
Leo and Ofshe allude to this problem in recommending that
courts should focus on the accuracy of the confession rather
than "exclusively on the procedural fairness of the interrogation
process. "s 4  Professor White, too, has observed that "[u]ntil
about thirty-five years ago, [reliability] played an important role
in our constitutional jurisprudence .... Over the past three
decades, however, courts and legal commentators have largely
ignored issues relating to untrustworthy confessions."21 While
one must be cautious of the logical fallacy post hoc, ergo propter
hoc, the Miranda revolution in interrogation law seems like an
obvious culprit. In theory, of course, Miranda does not require
the courts to concentrate "exclusively" on procedural ques-
tions-the underlying constitutional "voluntariness" test still
remains in play.2 But in practice, the Miranda rules have led
the courts away from any close scrutiny of voluntariness-and,
hence, trustworthiness-in individual cases, precisely the kind
of scrutiny that might help false confessors. Since Miranda, the
Supreme Court has only rarely reversed convictions on involun-
tariness grounds. This has produced, in turn, an attitude in
many lower courts "toward voluntariness claims that can only be
called cavalier. " M In many cases Miranda has "served to insulate
Id. at 206. Cf Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961) (holding that the
question of voluntariness should be decided without regard to whether a particular
suspect "in fact spoke the truth"); Dix, supra note 229, at 263-69 (discussing the
Court's ambivalence about reliability).
" Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 12, at 1119.
White, supra note 3, at 156.
See GRANO, supra note 229, at 207.
"7 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 745
(1992). Indeed, since Miranda, the Court appears to have cut back on the impor-
tance of reliability concerns to the voluntariness test. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479
U.S. 157, 167-68 (1986) (holding that reliability of confession induced by pressures
other than that of state actors is not governed by the Constitution, but by state laws).
It is too early to tell how broadly Connelly will be interpreted. See generally Dix, supra
note 229, at 272-76 (discussing questions left unanswered after Connelly).
Seidman, supra note 237, at 746; accord StephenJ. Schulhofer, Confessions and the
Court, 79 MICi-. L. Rrv. 865, 877-78 (1981) (reviewing YALE KAMISAR, POLICE
INTERROGATION AND CoNFEssIoNs: ESsAYIN LAW AND POLICY (1980)) (noting the "often
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the resulting confessions from claims that they were coerced or
involuntary." 29 The net effect is that Miranda may actually make
it easier to admit confessions from 
the innocent.2 ak
This is an inherent feature of Miranda's radical shift away
from attention to individual cases and towards more general
regulation of law enforcement techniques. Under the "volun-
tariness" approach, courts decided whether to admit a confes-
sion "on the peculiar, individual set of facts of the case"24' after
making a "broad [inquiry into the] totality of the circumstances
surrounding the confession."242 In contrast, the "the whole
point of Miranda was to eliminate the old 'voluntariness' test,
whereby courts determined case-by-case whether defendant's
will was overborne by coercion .... 24S Thus, Miranda set forth
generalized, legislative-style rules. The Court in Miranda itself
did not turn to the facts of the cases before it until it had de-
voted more than fifty pages to a summary of its holding, a his-
tory of the Fifth Amendment, a survey of police manuals, an
elaboration of its holding, and "a miscellany of minor direc-
tives, 244 not actually involved in the cases. The resulting warn-
ing-and-waiver regime allowed the Court to adjudicate the
problems of "defendants as a group rather than as individuals,
and ... finally abandon the fact-specific investigation of indi-
vidual circumstances that had been a hallmark of confession law
for the previous thirty years."24 While the Court professed to
leave open the possibility that it would consider individual
claims of coercion even in cases where police had complied with
Miranda, it clearly anticipated that the specified procedures
would dispense with the need to investigate the vast majority of
such claims.246 This is all well and good if one is concerned
about judicial efficiency. But for an innocent false confessor
conveyed" impression "that Miranda marked the death of the due process test and
that, at least for the time being, it remains buried").
"9 Seidman, supra note 237, at 744-45.
240 See Stuntz, supra note 217, at 47 n.160.
241 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 622 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.).
242 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960).
2' People v. Alls, 629 N.E.2d 1018, 1027 (N.Y. 1994) (Kaye, CJ., dissenting in part)
(citation omitted).
214 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966) (Harlan,J., dissenting).




ensnared in the system, a fact-specific investigation of individual
circumstances is the best hope of escaping conviction.
Miranda has also produced what Professor Grano has aptly
described as the "triumph of formalism"24 7 that further imperils
the innocent. After Miranda, courts considering confessions
typically are asked to decide such issues as whether the suspect
was in custody or was in some way interrogated. These ques-
tions are determined under "objective" tests that divert atten-
tion away from what a suspect actually thinks or believes. In
determining whether a suspect is in custody, for instance, the
courts ask "how a reasonable man in the suspect's position
would have understood his situation,"248 an inquiry that, Grano
explains, "does not provide a clue to whether the actual defen-
dant felt compelled to answer questions."249
The focus does remain on a particular defendant in one
area of Miranda doctrine: assessing whether a waiver of Miranda
rights was knowing and intelligent.20 But even here, the courts
are to focus not on the confession, but only on the preliminary
procedural question of the execution of a waiver. For example,
in Wyrick v. Fields,2' the defendant executed a Miranda waiver
(both orally and in writing) and took a polygraph test.22 After
the test, the operator told the defendant that he had been de-
ceptive and ultimately obtained incriminating statements.23 As
framed by the Court the main issue boiled down not to whether
announcing the test results pressured the defendant, but rather
to whether a new Miranda waiver was required after the poly-
graph test-an issue the Court resolved against the defendant.25
Thus, as Leo has suggested, "Miranda has shifted the legal in-
quiry from whether the confession was voluntarily given to
whether the Miranda rights were voluntarily waived"-the net
... GRANO, supra note 229, at 206-16; see aso Joseph D. Grano, Miranda v. Arizona
and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Reason, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
243, 267-87 (1986).
2"48 Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); accord Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (defining test for whether "interrogation" took place).
14' GRANO, supra note 229, at 208.
20 See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1979).
2" 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curium).
"'
2 Id. at 44. Ofshe and Leo suggest that polygraph tests can produce false confes-
sions See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 12, at 1036-41.
2's Wyrick, 459 U.S. at 44-45.
24 Id. at 47-49.
546 [Vol. 88
MRANDA
result being to "elevat[e] the form of legal process over the sub-
stance of legal outcomes."25 All this accentuates "those features
in our system that manifest the least regard for truth-seeking.""6
Thus, the courts addressing these issues are unlikely to be of as-
sistance to innocent persons. Instead of assisting courts in iden-
tifying situations where reliability might be of special concern,
"Miranda has induced judges at all levels to split hairs over the
meaning of black-letter rubrics. As they debate the technical
requirements of the binding black letter, judges often feel
obliged to ignore... the underlying purpose of the whole en-




Miranda diverts not only judicial attention towards proce-
dural issues, but also, as a consequence, skews defense resources
in that direction as well. In a brilliant recent article, Bill Stuntz
explained this problem:
[M] ost Miranda violations probably have little to do with the reliability of
the statements being suppressed. For these sorts of claims, defense liti-
gation not only fails to advance separation of the guilty from the inno-
cent, it actually retards the system's ability to separate. Defense lawyers
shifting time and energy from factual investigation to criminal proce-
dure litigation are probably shifting time and energy from one set of de-
fendants to another, and the losers in this shift are likely to be
defendants with colorable but undiscovered factual arguments.m
All of these adverse effects on the innocent should come as
little surprise, given that Miranda's main concern was not pro-
tecting the guiltless, but rather protecting the guilty.2 59 Al-
though the opinion briefly alludes to the existence of false
confessions, 260 its overwhelming bulk is devoted to the proposi-
tion that custodial interrogation "trades on the weakness of in-
dividuals"261-that is, the unfortunate (in the Court's mind)
tendency of some suspects to confess to what they have actually
Leo, Impact of Miranda, supra note 42, at 678 (quoting Patrick Malone, You Have
the Right to Rmain Silent: Miranda After Twenty Yean, 55 AM. ScHoLAR 367, 377
(1986)).
2 HARoi J. RoTHwAx, GULLTn'. Tim COLLAPsE OF THE CRIMJALJuST1CE SirEM 86
(1996).
" GRANO, supra note 229, at 215; see Leo, Impact of Miranda, supra note 42, at 678
(reaching similar conclusion).
2 Stuntz, supra note 217, at 47 (footnotes omitted).
2' See generally AmAR, supra note 1, at 28 (developing this point in the exclusionary
rule context).
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58 (1966).
6' Id at 455.
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done.26 Allowing police questioning to proceed without warn-
ings, the Court alleged, is inconsistent with "our accusatory sys-
tem of criminal justice," which "demands that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against
him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel,
simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth."2  The
concern was not with whether what came from the suspect's
mouth was a true confession or a false one. The Court's focus
on the guilty was no doubt reinforced by the parties before the
court: Ernesto Miranda and the three defendants whose cases
were all consolidated with Miranda's had all committed terrible
crimes.2  With the Court designing new rules to protect such
law breakers, it is almost to be expected that Miranda would
have unintended consequences for the law abiding.
While doing nothing about, and perhaps even aggravating,
the false confession problem, Miranda has simultaneously re-
duced significantly the number of truthful confessions-to the
clear detriment of innocent persons who would benefit from
having these crimes solved correctly. The Court itself expected
to make it harder for the government to resort to the "simple
expedient" of garnering confessions.2  Previously, in other
journals, I have outlined five mutually-reinforcing reasons for
concluding that Miranda produced this anticipated result. First,
the reliable "before-and-after" studies of confession rates done
at the time of the decision suggest that Miranda caused the con-
fession rate to fall by about 16% . Responding to these calcula-
tions, Professor Stephen Schulhofer has estimated that the
reduction in the confession rate is more accurately pegged at
around 5.8% compared to interrogations without any form of
warnings, or about 4.1% when compared to interrogations with
"'See generally Gerald M. Caplan, QuestioningMiranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1469-
73 (1985).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
'On remand, Ernesto Miranda was convicted of kidnapping and rape, Roy Stew-
art was convicted of first degree murder, and Michael Vignera and Carl Westover pled
guilty to robbery. See LvA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW, AND PoLrlicS 191-94 & n.*
(1983).
20 See Givelber, supra note 125, at 1379 (concluding that Miranda is of greatest im-
mediate benefit to the guilty and that it thus "renders it harder for the truly innocent
to have their voices heard and acknowledged").
26 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
67 See Cassell, supra note 57, at 416-18.
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some warnings. 2 8 Extrapolating across arrests for FBI index
crimes' produces the result that lost confessions from Miranda
are somewhere between 110,000 and 440,000 per year, depend-
ing on whether one uses Schulhofer's lowest figure or my
higher (and, as I have argued at some length, more reasonable)
figure. 270
Second, supporting the conclusion of the before-and-after
studies, confession rates in this country after Miranda appear to
be lower than the rates reported before the decision. For ex-
ample, Bret Hayman and I found that police obtained confes-
sions or incriminating statements in Salt Lake City in 1994 in
about 33% of their cases, below the roughly 55-60% success rate
that apparently prevailed in this country before Miranda.27
Similarly, Professor Leo's 1993 research in northern California
reported that detectives who questioned suspects in custody
were successful 64% of the time. 2 To be comparable to other
studies, this rate needs to be adjusted by considering that some
suspects are not questioned, some are not questioned in cus-
tody, and some are questioned by less-than-skilled line officers.
If these adjustments are made, the resulting confession rate is
about 37%,27 not far from ours and well below those reported
before Miranda. The few other available post-Miranda confes-
sion rate figures also suggest that confession rates have fallen. 4
Third, the confession rates in this country appear to be
lower than confession rates in Britain and Canada-countries
Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 545.
'9 See Cassell, supra note 57, at 438-39 (explaining why extrapolation against arrests
may produce a more accurate estimate of Miranda's costs); cf Schulhofer, supra note
19, at 538-39 (not contesting this aspect of the extrapolation). Using conviction
rather than arrest data for the extrapolation would produce a figure about three
times lower. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (one in three arrests lead to
conviction). These figures include juvenile offenders. Cf. supra notes 84, 178 (ex-
cluding juvenile offenders from calculations).
20 See Cassell, All Benefits, supra note 200, at 1084-115 (responding to Schulhofer);
cf. Leo, Impact of Miranda, supra note 42, at 676 n.243 (arguing that the "outdated"
before-and-after studies "cannot reasonably serve as the basis for extrapolations").
2' See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 868-76. But cf. Thomas, Plain Talk, supra
note 20, at 953-59 (concluding that the Cassell-Hayman study provides insufficient
evidence to reject the "null hypothesis" that the confession rate today is the same as
before Miranda).27 Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42, at 280 tbl.7.
r' See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 876, 926-30. But ef. Thomas, Plain Talk,
supra note 20, at 953-59 (disputing this recalculation).
7 See Cassell & Hayman, supra note 36, at 875-76.
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that do not follow Miranda-style requirements. 5 Fourth, police
officers at the time of Miranda reported that the decision
harmed their efforts to solve crimes.26 Fifth and finally, time se-
ries regression analysis reveals substantial, post-Miranda declines
in clearance rates, that is, the rates at which the police solve or
cc 271"clear" crimes. 78 Crime clearance rates for various crime cate-
gories fell sharply in 1966-68, immediately after the Miranda de-
cision. In another article, Professor Richard Fowles and I used
multiple regression analysis to separate the effects of competing
factors and concluded that Miranda results in lost clearances
each year of 8,000-36,000 robberies, 17,000-82,0000 burglaries,
6,000-163,000 larcenies, and 23,000-78,000 vehicle thefts.m All
these arguments establish what ought to be a logical point: that
when Miranda imposed unprecedented new restrictions on po-
lice interrogations, the effectiveness of such interrogations de-
clined.28 °
Because Miranda has reduced the number of confessions,
some innocent persons have been unable to use those confes-
sions to extricate themselves from erroneous charges. This is
apparent simply from the vast numbers of lost confessions and
clearances; certainly some of them would have been useful to in-
nocent persons. Professor Sam Gross' study of eyewitness mis-
identification independently confirms this important point.
Gross found that "the dominant basis of exoneration" for a per-
' See id. at 876-80; Cassell, supra note 57, at 418-22. But cf. Thomas, Plain Talk, su-
pra note 20, at 942-43 (arguing that Britain and Canada do not share the same "core
of relevant characteristics" to allow transnational comparisons).
26 Cassell, All Benefits, supra note 200, at 1106-10.
See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops?: A Thirty Year Perspec-
tive on Miranda HarmfulEffects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN L. REV. 1055 (1998).
278 See, e.g., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1995, supra note 86, at 197.
' Cassell & Fowles, supra note 277, at 1106. Our findings have prompted a lively
debate. Compare John J. Donohue, III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?', 50
STAN. L. REv. 1147 (1998) (replicating many of the Cassell and Fowles findings and
raising questions about them), with Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Falling Clearance
Rates After Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998) (noting
replication and responding to Donohue). Compare also Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Miranda and Clearance Rates, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 278 (1996) (challenging the claim that
Miranda harmed clearance rates), with Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on
Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 327, 334-40
(1997) (responding to Schulhofer), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Bashing Miranda is
Unjustified-and Harmful, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 347, 355-72 (1997) (responding
to Cassell). The figures on clearance rates in the text include juvenile offenders. Cf
supra notes 84, 178, 269 (excludingjuvenile offenders from calculation).
..0 See Cassell, supra note 279, at 343.
[Vol. 88
MIRANDA
son wrongly identified and wrongly convicted was that later "the
actual criminal confessed. 28 ' Distressingly, Gross also reported
that, in his collection of miscarriages spanning the decades
from 1900 to 1983, a distinct historical shift was apparent: "[I]t
is difficult to read these misidentification stories without con-
cluding that a significant change took place some time between
the mid-1950s and the early 1970s.282 Gross cites as a typical
earlier case: "the actual criminal was arrested on an unrelated
charge and, after being held in custody for a day or two, she
confessed to the perpetration of all the crimes charged to the
misidentified suspect.,2 Since then, such exonerations
through true confessions appear to have declined significantly.
Gross cites among the possible causes the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Miranda v. Arizona, which "may result in some reduc-
tion in the number of confessions. "2s
Miranda may also perversely harm the innocent by creating
precisely those conditions in which Leo and Ofshe believe that
police are most likely to extract false confessions: unsolved high
286profile cases. As Leo and Ofshe explain, "[i]nterrogators
sometimes become so committed to closing a case that they im-
properly and/or inappropriately use psychological interroga-
tion techniques to coerce or persuade a suspect into giving a
statement that allows the interrogator to make the arrest."287 It
is easy to believe that Miranda-by producing ten of thousands
of unsolved crimes-could produce this pressure on police. in
more than a few cases.
Considered together, Miranda's net effect on false and true
confessions is harmful to innocent persons. The decision does
virtually nothing to help false confessors (and may actually
2 Gross, EyewitnessIdenti/ication, supra note 25, at 421.
2Id. at 431.
Id. (internal quotation omitted).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Gross, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 25, at 431. Gross also suggests Gideon v.
Wainwrigh 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which recognized the right of indigents to ap-
pointed counsel, and "the entire Warren Court criminal procedure jurisprudence" as
possible causes of the apparent decline in confessions. Gross, Eyewitness Identification,
supra note 25, at 431. Miranda is a far more likely cause. See generally Cassell & Fowles,
supra note 277 (collecting evidence and arguing that Miranda is the most likely cause
for changes in the confession rate during the 1960s).
See Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 12, at 987.
2
'
7 Leo & Ofshe, supra note 2, at 440.
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make their plight worse) while not infrequently harming other
innocents by preventing police from identifying the actual per-
petrators of crimes.
B. REGULATING INTERROGATIONS TO PROTECT THE INNOCENT
Because Miranda affirmatively harms the innocent, simply
abolishing the decision would be helpful to those who are inno-
cent.ss In considering ways to protect the innocent, however,
we are not limited to choosing between abolishing Miranda or
retaining it. Miranda may have done its most serious damage to
the innocent by effectively blocking consideration of superior
ways of regulating police questioning. When the Court an-
nounced Miranda in 1966, various efforts to reform the interro-
gation rules were underway.2n The decision itself seemed to
invite continued exploration of such alternatives, promising that
"[o]ur decision in no way creates a constitutional straitacket
which will handicap sound efforts at reform."2° The Court's
promise has proven to be an empty one. In the quarter of a
century since Miranda, reform efforts have been virtually nonex-
istent. The reasons are not hard to imagine. No state is willing
to risk possible invalidation of criminal convictions by departing
from the Miranda regime.2' As a result, as the Office of Legal
Policy concludes, Miranda has "petrified the law of pre-trial in-
' Progress in this direction in federal courts would result from enforcing 18
U.S.C. § 3501, the statute "repealing" Miranda, and reestablishing the voluntariness
test as the sole standard for admissibility of confessions in federal cases. See generally
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 462-63 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring); United
States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975) (upholding § 3501). Recently a dis-
trictjudge in Utah upheld the statute and concluded that it superceded Miranda. See
United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 988 F. Supp. 1424 (D. Utah. 1997). The Fourth Circuit
has also recently expressed interest in the statute, although the litigation there has yet
to produce conclusive results. See Obscure Anti-Miranda Statute Prompts Heated Debate in
CA4 Cases, 11 Crim. Prac. Rep. 375 (Sept. 24, 1997). (Note: I served as counsel for
the crime victims groups seeking application of the statute in these cases.) While the
current Department ofJustice is disinclined to raise the issue in the lower courts, see
id., a strong argument can be made that federal judges are obligated to raise on their
own initiative the issue of the applicability of an Act of Congress. See Eric D. Miller,
Comment, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S.C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1998).
2" See OLP PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION REPORT, supra note 214, at 40-41, 58-61;
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 523 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the "ironic untimeliness" of
the Court's new confession rules in view of on-going "massive reexamination of
criminal law enforcement procedures on a scale never before witnessed").
2w Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
,9' See Stuntz, supra note 217, at 53-54 n.178.
[Vol. 88
M/RANDA
terrogation... foreclosing the possibility of developing and im-
plementing alternatives that would be of greater effectiveness
both in protecting the public from crime and in ensuring fair
treatment of persons suspected of crime."2 Nothing is likely to
change in the future so long as Miranda remains on the books,
perpetuating a perceived risk of invalidation for any state that
chooses to go a different way.
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The "petrification" of pre-trial interrogation law has effec-
tively prevented consideration of alternatives that would protect
the innocent against false confessions, while at the same time al-
lowing police to gain more true confessions to exonerate those
who have wrongfully come under suspicion and to prosecute
those who are guilty of such offenses. One such solution is to
videotape police interrogations while simultaneously loosening
the most onerous Miranda restrictions on police questioning, a
proposal I have spelled out elsewhere.2 Specifically, police
should be required to videotape (or perhaps audiotape) all cus-
todial interrogations, unless the suspects objects or recording
equipment clearly malfunctions. With videotaping in place to
protect suspects, the Miranda rules could then be relaxed to al-
low police to obtain more confessions, particularly by eliminat-
ing the requirements that police obtain an affirmative "waiver"
of rights before custodial questioning and that they immediately
cease questioning if a suspect asks to see a lawyer. Such modifi-
cations are permissible because the Miranda restraints extend
beyond what the Constitution requires29s and because such
292 OLP PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION REPORT, supra note 214, at 99.
29 Id.
' See Cassell, supra note 57, at 486-98.
25 See GRANO, supra note 229, at 173-99; Cassell, supra note 57, at 471-73; Cassell, All
Benefits, supra note 200, at 1115-18; Paul G. Cassell, The Costs oftheMiranda Mandate: A
Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. UJ.
299, 300-03 (1996). But see Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 553-56. Akhil Amar has also
suggested that this videotaping proposal would be constitutional in noting that a vari-
ety of schemes for regulating the police interrogation are consistent with the Fifth
Amendment. AMAR, supra note 1, at 77. Given Amar's overriding focus on protecting
the innocent, the empirical evidence discussed in this Article strongly argues in favor
of what Amar styles the more "relaxed" versions of police interrogation, i at 77, and
against some of the versions Amar discusses that could interfere with police question-
ing. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1457 (1997) (reviewing AMR, supra note 1, and discussing ways in which confes-
sions would be lost under some of Amar's proposals).
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modifications simply adopt the Court's suggestion that alterna-
tives to Miranda may be considered.2
Videotaping would undeniably help false confessors. Video-
taping creates the possibility of detecting police coercion in
forcing suspects to give "confessions." The tape also helps re-
veal whether a suspect is actually confessing to a crime he com-
mitted or to crime implanted in his mind by police questioning,
as Leo and Ofshe's research generally illustrates.27 A report in
the American Lawyer describing three false confessions to in-
volvement in the Buddhist temple murders in Phoenix provides
a good example.28 While tape recorders were running, police
obtained several false confessions in apparent compliance with
Miranda. While the real killers were discovered before the in-
nocent men stood trial, the American Lawyer concluded that
"[o]nly these tape recordings gave the suspects any chance of
defending themselves at trial." The tapes revealed that police
had fed information to the suspects, only to have the informa-
tion fed back to them later, and that the police had been able to
"tidy up" details in the suspects "confessions."3
Supporters of videotaping on false confessions grounds-
including Leo, Ofshe, White, and Alschuler-simply urge that
videotaping be added to the Miranda rules.s1 But this is plainly
not the optimal approach to protecting the innocent. Only by
coupling recording with the elimination of the most harmful of
the Miranda requirements can we unambiguously ensure that
the police will receive more true confessions-and thus more
exonerations of innocent persons wrongfully under suspicion.
See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
27Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 238. Others have reached simi-
lar conclusions. See, e.g., LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN & SAUL M. KASSN, CONFESSIONS IN
THE COURTROOM 134-35 (1993) (describing examination of tape of confession to
demonstrate that it was false); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False Confessions,
NEW LJ., Sept. 18, 1992, at 1277 (concluding that tape recording allows more atten-
tion to "the identification of individual vulnerabilities when disputing the reliability of
confession statements").
' See Parloff, supra note 12; see also White, supra note 3, at 128-31 (discussing the
temple murder case); Ofshe & Leo, Social Psychology, supra note 12, at 226-31 (same).
' Parloff, supra note 12, at 38; see also Philip Weiss, Untrue Confessions, MOTHER
JoNEs, Sept. 1989, at 20 ("The police made just one mistake: they turned on a tape
recorder during Sawyer's sixteen-hour interrogation. Were it not for that recording,
Sawyer would have stayed a nobody, good-bye kind of guy... who looked like he sure
might have killed somebody and had even said as much").
' Parloff, supra note 12, at 58.
'0' See e.g., White, supra note 3, at 153-55; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 12, at 238.
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While the available empirical evidence generally suggests that
videotaping does not inhibit suspects, there are a few indica-
tions to the contrary. M2 For example, 28.3% of police agencies
in a National Institute of Justice survey thought that suspects
were somewhat less willing to talk on videotape. - 3 To guarantee
that the new regime produces more true confessions, the old
Miranda restraints must be loosened at the same time videotap-
ing is added. Changing the Miranda waiver and questioning cut-
off rules would probably eliminate most of Miranda's costs, pro-
ducing tens of thousands of additional confessions each
year-no doubt exonerating some innocent persons who are
wrongfully under suspicion and, as an added benefit, helping to
protect the innocent from further criminal deprivations at the
hands of these offenders. Scaling back the Miranda rules would
also direct the courts (and defense attorneys) away from formal-
istic concerns about Miranda procedures and back to consider-
ing the voluntariness of the confession itself.35 Loosening the
Miranda "handcuffs" also has the important practical advantage
of providing a substantial inducement for conservative law en-
forcement agencies to use videotaping technology.e
Some will, of course, oppose any change to Miranda. That
opposition will be strongest from those who want to preserve-
largely for symbolic and political reasons-the epitome of War-
307ren Court activism on behalf of criminal defendants. But no
02See Cassell, supra note 57, at 492.
-"3 WILIAM A. GELLER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICE VMEOTAPING OF SusPECr
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF ISSUES AND
PRACFCS-A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL INST=UTE OFJUSTICE 107 fig.20 (1992).
See Cassell, supra note 57, at 492-97.
Some might argue that a reinvigorated voluntariness test would be worse for ef-
fective prosecution than the current Miranda rules. A straightforward comparison of
the number of confessions lost due to Miranda with the number of cases that might
be lost due to the voluntariness test will allay this concern. Miranda eliminates con-
fessions from approximately one out of every six (16%) criminal suspects. See Cassell,
supra note 57, at 417. On the other hand, genuine voluntariness issues are presented
in only a tiny fraction of cases. See id. at 476 (collecting evidence on this point); Leo,
Inside the Interrogation Room, supra note 42, at 282 (finding only 2% of interrogations
involve "coercive" methods).
"6 Cassell, supra note 12,'at 1133.
Compare Schulhofer, supra note 19, at 562 (not discussing problem of innocent
defendants, but opposing videotaping as a replacement for Miranda, because "proce-
dure matters"), with Cassell, All Benefits, supra note 200, at 1121 (criticizing Schulhofer
for failing to discuss the issue of innocent defendants). See also Leo, Impact of
Miranda, supra note 42, at 680 (concluding that "even though Miranda may impede
the efficiency of some criminal investigations, there would be little point in overrul-
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goal of our criminal justice system is more important than pro-
tecting the innocent. As between retaining symbols and helping
innocent persons, the choice should be clear. Miranda epito-
mizes the wrong turn our criminal justice system made in the
1960s. In that case (among others), the Warren Court lost sight
of the goal of protecting the innocent in its zeal to create novel
procedural rights primarily of use to the guilty. It is time to re-
store the traditional focus on the innocent. Replacing Miranda
with a videotape regime would be a good way to start.
ing Miranda this late in its history"); White, supra note 3, at 121 (urging retention of
Miranda "as a symbol of our commitment to maintaining a fair system of criminal
procedure").
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